


OPERATION SALAM

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SALAM 3

Mission Report

(7 October - 19 November 1988)

Geneva
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Office of the Co-ordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan

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المساعدة الانسانية والاقتصادية
المتصلة بأفغانستان

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PREFACE

To begin with, it is essential to point out the relative nature of the contents of this report. This must be done for two reasons: firstly because it would be dishonest not to do so, both with respect to the reader and to the Afghans who allowed us to travel within their country, and secondly in order to attract attention to the risks involved in extrapolating the various elements of this report, without due precaution, to cover the whole of Afghanistan and over a long time period. The relative nature of the report's conclusions is a function of several factors:

Space: The SALAM 3 mission covered a limited number of regions, and the itinerary followed does not even justify the systematic generalization to a whole region of the observations made in a particular valley located in that region.

Time: This report provides no more than a rough picture of the areas crossed at a specific point in time. The most "blurred" elements are probably the most sensitive to time, but they can also be significant, whether positive or negative for any subsequent assistance programme (eg. the new structures which are being put in place with a view to reconstruction, the zones of influence of the different parties, the relations between civilian society and the military or administrative superstructure, etc.). As a general rule, what makes sense today could turn out to be mere illusion tomorrow, just as what appears secondary now may be crucial in the future.

Time of year: The time of year at which the mission took place (October-November) was not favourable to the proper observation of agricultural activities and production.

Cultural difference: For a foreigner in Afghanistan, and the members of the mission were all foreigners, Afghan reality is practically inaccessible, and the very essence of the country's originality and vigor defies observation and definition. The observer can do no more than distinguish what emerges from the hidden face of reality without ever being able to perceive its roots. Trying to understand the subtle system of balances underlying that reality is more a matter of guesswork than observation. Thus, accurate observations may lead to faulty conclusions.

Many other factors dictate considerable modesty with regard to the pertinence of the observations made and the conclusions reached, be it the ethnic plurality, the religious diversity, the heterogeneity of political allegiances in certain regions, or the feeling of specific identity among the different segments of the populations -- a feeling intensified by the war.

However, despite this diversity, findings and patterns do emerge which justify a certain measured optimism with regard to the possibility of a decisive contribution by the United Nations to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Suffice it to say that the mission received the warmest of welcomes wherever it went, and that all the persons met expressed the hope that the United Nations would participate in the reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts.

PART I BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 Purpose of the mission

1.1.1 Introduction

The Salam 3 mission is part of a broader assessment of the situation in Afghanistan aimed at defining the framework for United Nations action with respect to all matters concerning assistance to the population: rehabilitation, reconstruction, return of displaced persons and refugees, de-mining, etc. The desire to help any populations in whatever region without discrimination is embodied in the decision taken by the Co-ordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan to take the initiative and meet the populations wherever they happened to be rather than waiting for hypothetical emissaries.

It was necessary for an assessment programme of this type to field a certain number of missions to territories currently outside of the control of the Kabul Government. Salam 3 is the first of these missions. The public and, of course, the United Nations itself, are aware of the critical attitude of Afghans opposed to the Kabul Government with regard to the international institution. The general strategy of which Salam 3 is a part constitutes an act of goodwill on the part of the institution, and a proof of its good faith. It is up to the Afghans to decide on the pertinence of the approach, but the mission had to be carried out in order to give them a chance to do so.

A secondary but nevertheless significant purpose of Salam 3 was to establish the institutions's legitimacy since, as with all of the other actors which have already been working inside Afghanistan for some time, the United Nations was submitting itself to initiation procedures. Thus, alongside the explicit aims mentioned below, Salam 3 had a symbolic role which should not be underestimated.

1.1.2 Explicit objectives

In accordance with the terms of reference of the mission drawn up by the UN Co-ordinator, these objectives are as follows:

- To assess the overall situation with a view to eventual implementation of UN humanitarian and economic assistance programmes.

- To identify logistical problems and possible solutions, particularly with regard to potential returnees and displaced persons.

- To provide a preliminary assessment of the physical conditions in areas visited and to assess the needs in the light of the Co-ordinator's mandate.

- To establish contacts with local authorities for the UN's efforts in the future.

A final point concerns UNHCR which should, if the opportunity arises, discuss with local authorities issues and activities related to its specific mandate and the role assigned to the Office of the High Commissioner in the Geneva Accords and in the subsequent agreement signed between UNHCR and the Kabul Government.

1.1.3. Secondary objectives

Shortly before its departure from Pakistan, Salam 3 was given two very precise objectives based on the reports of two missions carried out by NGOs in Badakhshan and Panjshir:

- to assess the extent of the need for food resulting from the shortage of the 1988 harvest in Badakhshan;

- to visit the Panjshir valley in order to determine whether the return en masse of several thousand displaced persons justified the organization of emergency assistance projects.

1.2 <u>The participants</u>

The members of the expedition are listed below:

1.2.1.	Jean-Jose PUIG	Representative of the Co-ordinator and Team Leader
	Alfredo WITSCHI-CESTARI	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
	Michael von der SCHULENBURG	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
	Burkard W. OBERLE	World Food Programme (WFP)

1.2.2 They were accompanied by six members representing three parties of the Alliance (two persons per party):

- Jamiat-e-Islami (Leader: Prof. B. Rabbani)
- Mahaz-e-Milli Islami (Leader: pir Sayyed Gaiani)
- Itihad-e-Islami (Leader: Prof. A. Rasul Sayyaf).

The chief of the Group was Engineer Mohammed ARIF, member of Jamiat-e-Islami.

The Salam 3 mission met with varying degrees of acceptance among the different parties composing the Alliance, but none of them formally rejected it.

The trip provided an opportunity for the two groups to get to know each other better and for the various members to understand each other on an individual basis.

During the first four weeks the groups moved mainly on horseback and comprised over twenty people, including guides and stable boys.

1.3 Itinerary - Schedule

1.3.1 The principal stages

A detailed itinerary, accompanied by a map showing the route taken, is provided in Annex I.

The stages marking the principal contacts with the local authorities are the following:

- Skazer	(South Badakhshan)
- Warsaj	(Takhar)
- Mektab	(Takhar)
- Keshem	(Badakhshan)
- Barrak	(Panjshir - Kapisa)
- Deh-Sallah	(Andarab - Baghlan)
- Lakhawb	(Baghlan)
- Kayan	(Baghlan)
- Shashpul	(Bamiyan)
- Jeghatu	(Wardak)

All in all, the mission travelled through nine provinces: Nuristan, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kapisa, Bashlan, Bamiyan, Maidan/Wardak, Ghazni and Paktika. However, there was not enough time to carry out any assessment in the first and in the last two of these provinces.

The Hindu Kush/Koh-e-Baba mountain range was crossed six times at the following passes:

- Diwana Baba	(Pakistan/Afghanistan border)
- Kafir Kohtal	(Nuristan/Badakhshan border)
- Kohtal-e-Wishti	(Badakhshan/Takhar border)
- Kohtal-e-Darwasa	(Baghlan/Kapisa border)
- Kohtal-e-Khawak	(Kapisa/Baghlan border)
- Kohtal-e-Hajigak	(Bamiyan/Maidan border)

Only the last of these passes was crossed by truck.

The departure took place on 7 October 1988 at 10 a.m., and the border was crossed at the pass on the same day at 4 p.m..

The tarmac road to the north of Salang was crossed on 7 November at about 4 p.m..

The return journey began on 19 November 1988 at 7 a.m. and the border was crossed on 20 November 1988 at 8.15 a.m.

1.3.2 Climactic conditions

The late departure of the mission subjected it to the rigorous conditions characteristic of high mountains at the approach of winter. The first pass (Diwana Baba) was crossed in snow, and the descent took place at night. The crossing of the second pass was a particularly delicate operation in view of its altitude (approximately 5300 m) and of the ice which made both the access to the pass as well as the descent on the other side virtually impossible. Horses and people slipped and fell frequently, and a stable-boy belonging to a convoy from Khost (Baghlan) died of cold during the ascent.

The other passes were easier to cross, with the exception of the Kohtal-e-Darwasa, which is particularly long and took 15 hours on foot for the fastest.

Once the team had reached the other side of the high mountains beautiful weather prevailed: cool and dry, but extremely cold as soon as the sun went down. The days were short, and the mission limited the length of the daily journey, where possible, in order to avoid the particularly dangerous prospect of travelling by night.

It should be pointed out that this year, despite the often intense cold, the Hajigak pass, crossed on 15 November 1988, was still clear of snow.

1.3.3 Means of transport

In the north-eastern regions, the team travelled either on horseback or on foot, with the exception of two stages which were covered by car: from Warsaj to Keshem and in Panjshir (from Dasht-e-Rivat onwards).

The horses were definitively left behind in Kelagai, once the tarmac road had been crossed. From there onwards the team travelled by truck, and a minibus was used for the return journey to Pakistan.

Given the state of the dirt roads, travel by vehicle is extremely uncomfortable. The dust, the jolts and the cramped space are enough to turn any journey into an ordeal -- and yet it should not be forgotten that these "ordeals" are simply a part of everyday life for the Afghans.

On the other hand, travel on horseback or on foot is extremely slow, and requires many stopovers. This fact must be borne in mind when considering ts on grhe amount of time spent in each region, which was in fact directly dependant on the means of transport used.

1.4 The local authorities encountered

1.4.1. Commanders

In this report the word "commander" is used to describe persons exercising military responsibility within the framework of the armed opposition, which has generated, in addition, a certain number of civil and administrative officials. A distinction has been made between these officials and the commanders, and the former have been mentioned under the heading "Officials in Charge of New Structures".

Person	Place of activity	Date	Hierarchical Supervisor
Cdr. Malek	Maghnaul	09.10.88	Cdr.Najmuddin
Cdr. Formul	Skazer	10.10.88	Ahmad Shah Massoud
Ahmad Shah Massoud	Piu	15.10.88	Prof. Rabbani
Cdr. Aryanpoor	Jari-Sabah	20.10.88	Ahmad Shah Massoud
Cdr. Mahmud	Bazarak	31.10.88	Ahmad Shah Massoud
Cdr. Mufatesh	Nawbahar	05.11.88	Ahmad Shah Massoud
Cdr. Sufi Payendeh	Khinjan	06.11.88	Eng.G.Hekmatyar
Cdr. Nazatyar	Lakhawb	08.11.88	Eng.G.Hekmatyar
Cdr. Sayyed Esamuddin	Kayan	11.11.88	Pir.S.Mansur Kayan
Cdr. Anwari*	Kabul	15.11.88	A. Mosseyni Kandahari
Cdr. Amin Wardak	Jeghatu	17.11.88	Mawlawi Khales
Cdr. Mawlawi Ahmad Jan**	Maidan	18.11.88	Mawlawi Khales
Cdr. Zalmai Turfan**	Chardeh	18.11.88	Prof. Sayyaf

Time constraints made it impossible to meet three of the important commanders: Engineer Bashir (Hezb-e-Islami G. Hekmatyar, Baghlan region), Baz Mohamad (Mahaz-e-Milli, Barfak region), Mawlawi Addul Qayyum Malang (Harrakat-e-Enqelab, Kamard region).

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* Encountered in Kalu
** Encountered in Jaghatu

The team was able to meet with certain commanders several times: this was the case for Commander Massoud, with whom working sessions were also held near Farkhar, and for Commander Amin Wardak.

The hierarchy and importance of the commanders depends on the military structure of their respective parties, as outlined in Chapter 3. This aspect being outside the scope of the mission, the team did not attempt to gather any information on the subject beyond what was said spontaneously, except in cases where the commanders also exercised civilian and administrative responsibilities (cf. Ahmad Shah Massud, Aryanpoor, Qazi Amin Wardak).

1.4.2 Officials in charge of traditional structures

The expression is inaccurate: though the mission was able to meet many respectable and respected persons, it was impossible in most cases to ascertain their exact functions within civilian society. The only expressions of these traditional structures visible to the mission were the "village councils" and the assemblies of "Grey Beards", which were sometimes attended by the local commanders.

Exchanges took place with the civilian authorities at the following locations and dates:

Skazer	(South Badakhshan)	10.10.88
Jari-Sabah	(Keshem-Badakhshan)	20.10.88
Khost-e-Doabi	(Baghlan)	26.10.88
Nawbahar	(Baghlan)	04.11.88
Jeghatu	(Wardak)	17.11.88

Apart from these organized meetings, a number of informal contacts with civilian society also took place, inter alia:

Warsaj (Takhar)	Repr.	Esham Nabi	16.10.88
Fehring (Baghlan)	Repr.	Arbab Jamil	25.10.88
Keluk (Baghlan)	Repr.	Village Mullah	27.10.88
Lakhbaghj (Baghlan)	Repr.	Nassim-Jamil	03.11.88
Nawbahar (Baghlan)	Repr.	Haj Nur Ahmad	05.11.88
Kelagai (Baghlan)	Repr.	Ghulam Haydar	08.11.88
Shashpul (Bamiyan)	Repr.	Shaman Ali	13.11.88

And finally, the team was able, during its journey, to discuss the local situation with the stable-boys, the tea-house owners, the bazaar merchants and the vehicle drivers.

1.4.3 Officials in charge of new structures

The new structures were for the most part generated by the military organizations in order to facilitate contacts with the NGOs, but in the north-eastern region they have been considerably altered over the past two years or so. We were able to meet:

	Prof. Fazel	Head of the Educational Committee (in Warsaj) of the Supervisory Council (Shura-e-Nazar)
	Mr. Mohd Alim Quarashii	Deputy Chief of the Reconstruction (in Mektab) Committee of the Supervisory Council
	Mr. Mohd Tabbir	Deputy to Commander Aryanpoor in (in Keshem) charge of economic matters
	Dr. Abdur Rahman	Head of organization for zone 1 (in Mektab) of the Supervisory Committee
	Mr. Hashemi	Deputy to Professor Fazel on the (in Mektab) Educational Committee
	Mr. Latif	Head of Culture and Information (in Mektab) for the Supervisory Committee
	Engineer Kamaluddin	Head of the Panjshir (in Barrak) Reconstruction Committee
	Dr. Wallid	Medical Chief for the central zone (in Rokha) of the Supervisory Council
*	Engineer Mehrabuddin	Head of the Andarab Reconstruction Committee
**	Engineer Hashemi	Head of the development projects (in Shashpul) for the Shashpul region (organization: Mustazafin)
	Engineer Naji Baba	Head of the agricultural projects for the regions under the control of Qazi Amin Wardak

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* The Committee did not yet exist at the time of the mission's visit, but Engineer Mehrabuddin had been asked by Commander Mufatesh to form it.

** This military organization began long ago to implement small-scale civilian projects, and had for several months been concentrating essentially on the development of these projects (mechanical workshop, hospital, education, road repairs etc.)

The military commanders who participated actively in the organization of an administration or who exercise civilian authority have not been mentioned again in the above paragraph.

Lastly, the United Nations delegation was able to meet Professor Rabbani and Mr. Massoud Khalili near the village of Maghanaul in Badakhshan.

1.5. Characteristics of the regions visited

1.5.1 Administrative control

All of the regions crossed were outside the administrative control of the capital, Kabul. Though the exact status of the zone controlled by Pir Sayyed Mansur Kayan is subject to controversy, the mission did not come across a single trace of direct administration in that region.

1.5.2 Nature of the regions crossed

The mission's itinerary was specifically planned to avoid the cities and their immediate outskirts. The journey was limited entirely to rural areas with the exception of the town of DOSHI, which was crossed by truck, and the town of BAMIYAN, where the mission spent half a day.

Consequently, this report contains no information on the situation in the cities.

1.5.3 Refugees - Displaced persons

Very few people from the areas through which the mission travelled had sought refuge in Pakistan or Iran. The number of displaced persons in the region, however, was considerable. Population movements are now on the increase, generally in a homeward direction with the exception of an influx, in Panjshir, of families fleeing the insecurity caused by the resumption of military activity around GULBAHAR. In addition, approximately 2000 families from Hazarajat, fleeing from the armed conflicts affecting their region of origin, recently arrived in eastern Wardak.

2. General conclusions

2.1 Observations

For reasons of convenience, the observations are presented under three headings. They, however have a common characteristic: they have their own logic which, even if its effects are local and specific, applies to all of the regions visited.

2.1.1. General observations

- The mission noticed a great disparity in the amount of destruction which the various geographical areas had suffered. The zones which had suffered the most destruction corresponded to obvious strategic targets: the areas surrounding military bases (Skazer, Kelagai), the areas surrounding towns under government control (Ghazni), the areas adjacent to main roads (lower Andarab valley, Lakhawb, Dasht-e-Kelagai), pockets of fierce resistance (Panjshir).

- The regions were characterized by the fact that the number of displaced persons was high in comparison with the number of refugees. This phenomenon can be explained by the topographical and ethnic characteristics of the areas visited (cf. Part I).

- The fragmentation of the country is immediately visible, and is also determined by the same topographical, cultural, ethnic and religious factors on which political affiliations are partly based.

- In spite of this fragmentation, traditional structures are still very lively. In fact, these two phenomena are not contradictory, they are complementary: the rifts generally pass through the meeting points of the different civilian societies.

- Despite the differences, the needs expressed everywhere, and above all the priorities attributed to those needs, are practically identical. This convergence of attitudes is encouraging if it is a presage of the kind of convergence which will be required if Afghanistan is to win the struggle for the restoration of peace.

2.1.2 Economic observations

- While war still remains, despite everything, the primary preoccupation of the populations, the local, military and civilian authorities everywhere have begun putting peace on their agenda, and have begun to set up the structures which will be needed for the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of their country.

- In all of the regions visited, the populations were already busy in reconstructing individual houses, reclaiming fields and restoring private agricultural infrastructure.

- The populations encountered were generally very poor, and in some cases the poverty was extreme. Nowhere, however, were there any signs of misery. There are no beggars in the areas visited.

- The structures which have been set up, whatever their nature, suffer from a severe shortage of available financial resources. The reconstruction committees are unable to function without external aid, while Individuals are forced into debt in order to start their reconstruction effort.

- The economy is severely disrupted by a number of factors which are difficult to analyze, but the result of which is a high rate of inflation. Living conditions have consequently become more and more precarious, and the practice of barter is regaining importance.

- Finally, the failure to renew seed material, the lack of fertilizer and the conversion to dry-land farming of previously irrigated land in areas where irrigation systems have been destroyed or abandoned have led to a severe decrease in agricultural production. This situation was further aggravated by the drought of 1987-88.

2.1.3 Observations with regard to assistance

- All of the authorities, whether civilian or military, expressed their desire to have the United Nations contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

- No reserves were expressed concerning the origins of assistance. Only one condition was formulated: that it be under the UN emblem.

- The difficulties involved in the implementation of such assistance, however, are far from negligeable. Enormous logistical problems are posed by the deplorable state of the road network and by the fragmentation of the country. The efficiency of the new structures has not yet been put to the test with regard to the management of assistance programmes. The distribution and monitoring of assistance and the absorption capacity of the regions concerned still constitute unknown elements.

- In addition to the actual difficulties, there are genuine risks involved in poorly conceived and/or poorly implemented external assistance: increased fragmentation, economic disorder, social disruptions caused by the creation of "classes" in a classless society, cultural blockage in the face of inappropriate technology, to list but the most obvious examples. While the risk of alienation and dependance is considerably lower in the case of multilateral aid, it is very high in the case of bilateral aid (cf. Part IV).

2.2 Recommendations

Bearing in mind the above considerations, we have put forward a number of recommendations which constitute prerequisites to the implementation of United Nations of assistance programmes: they are not, however, sufficient conditions in themselves to ensure the success of such a programme.

2.2.1 Priorities

- Assistance efforts must concentrate on the primary needs expressed by the populations.

- As concerns the first of these needs, i.e. food, distribution without compensation should be avoided, except in specific cases involving emergency operations limited in time and area.

- With respect to the reconstruction of individual houses, the most crucial need is for construction timber. While the importation of such timber is necessary to speed up the reconstruction efforts and to prevent any further deterioration of the environment, it should only be distributed against some sort of compensation by the beneficiaries, however modest, in cash or in kind, to the bodies responsible for the management of such assistance.

- The restoration of agricultural production should take place at the level of the smallest economic entities -- families, villages -- through the supply of selected seeds and of fertilizers at subsidized prices, coupled with a credit system, possibly permitting reimbursement in kind. This implies the existence of bodies capable of managing the distribution of the goods in question and which would be financed through the distribution mechanism itself.

- As regards plantations, assistance efforts should aim at creating nurseries at the village level as a complement to the programme for the restoration of orchards. This effort should be extended to all regions, while the importation of building wood should prevent the further deterioration of the environment.

- The reconstitution of livestock, the improvement of poultry production and protection against epidemics affecting animals require a more precise assessment of the situation by zootechnicians and veterinarians.

- Finally, the infrastructural work involving the reconstruction of roads and tracks which were heavily damaged during the war, as well as the construction of new communication routes, could be carried out within the framework of the "food-for-work" programmes. It would probably be a good idea not to rely on sophisticated means, if only to ensure initially the possibility of providing work to a significant portion of the population. This scheme would thus contribute to fulfilling the primary need -- food -- by providing the families with cash, however modest the amount may be.

- The restoration or construction of the big irrigation canals should should follow the same model.

2.2.2 The choice of projects

The criteria on which the selection of projects is based should include the following considerations:

- The scale of the programmes must be adapted to the absorption capacity of the local counterparts.

- Projects must be defined in co-operation with the local authorities at the project location.

- Projects must be chosen with a view to avoiding, or at least considerably limiting, the creation of non-productive superstructures which could not be financed locally. Maximum use should be made, wherever possible, of private or village initiative.

2.2.3 Modus operandi of the United Nations

- In view of the inevitable multiplicity of assistance operations and the consequent proliferation of actors on the scene, the United Nations should ensure that it is perceived as one and the same partner for the different phases of the projects: assessments, definition, execution, monitoring. Assistance efforts must therefore be properly co-ordinated at all levels.

- The co-operating agencies should, where possible, be the Afghans themselves. Although potential partners already exist in some regions (reconstruction committees), they must be in a position to recruit their own staff locally and to ensure that they receive training and that they are payed (which, for the moment, implies external assistance).

For the regions where such potential partners do not yet exist, the United Nations could consider turning to certain NGOs on condition that they are fully accepted by the Afghans and that they have shown themselves to be efficient.

3. <u>PRESENT OVERALL SITUATION</u>

3.1 War Damages and Consequences

The most visible consequence of ten years of armed conflict in Afghanistan is the physical destruction caused by aerial and ground bombardments, rocket attacks, deliberate demolition, mines and the extensive use of heavy military vehicles. This destruction has affected, in particular:

- private habitat;
- agricultural land and infrastructure as well as trees and harvests;
- transport infrastructure such as roads, tracks and bridges;
- public buildings such as schools, hospitals, administrative centres and mosques.

In addition, mine fields, unexploded ordnance and scattered wreckages of military equipment constitute a long-term risk for the population, and obstruct agricultural and grazing land.

Most of the patients in the four hospitals visited had suffered severe injuries that were caused by mines, unexploded ordnance and continued armed conflicts. At the hospital in the Panjshir Valley, within a period of three months all except four of the 300 operations were related to war injuries. Many of the disabled were children who had lost either a leg or an arm. As children are often engaged in herding their family animals on grazing land away from villages and in searching for fire wood, this particular group appears to be very vulnerable to mine risks.

Relatively few families from the regions that the mission travelled through had left for Pakistan or Iran. The only areas that had produced refugees were the lower Andarab Valley, the Lakhawb Valley and the area around Kilagay, east of the Salang road. The population of these areas approximately 60,000 people, had left for Pakistan very early in the conflict and there were no signs indicating their return. All persons met affirmed that there would be no repatriation before the departure of all foreign troops, and that afterwards, return movements would depend on the specific political and socioeconomic conditions prevailing in their area of origin.

It was not possible for the mission to estimate the losses in human life, but throughout the entire route, countless new graves could be seen. Many people have lost one or several members of their family. From the information gathered it seems that many more civilians than members of armed groups have lost their lives.

In numerous areas, a large section of the population was subject to internal displacement, and a part of the population still is. The decision to seek refuge elsewhere seems to be made jointly by a whole community and to depend, at least partly, on ethnical and cultural affiliations. The distances to Pakistan or Iran appear to have little influence.

It is virtually impossible to estimate the exact numbers of internally displaced persons. The timing and duration of displacement depends on the intensity of bombardments and direct fighting, and can range from a few days to several years. Many families met by the mission had had to leave their villages more than once and had faced repeated destruction of their homes.

Because of the difficulties involved in ensuring a livelihood away from their villages, displaced families return home as soon as the situation permits. Since the beginning of this year many have already done so, probably encouraged by the relative concentration of war activities in specific areas which followed the Geneva Accords. With the exception of Maghnaoul, Lakhawb, lower Andarab and areas along the Salang Highway, the mission saw almost no completely abandoned villages or devastated or abandoned agricultural land.

The largest single group of internally displaced persons that the mission encountered were from the Panjshir Valley. Owing to military activities, a very large majority of the population of approximately 150,000 people had left the valley in 1984, and had started to move back in large numbers in May 1988. At the time of the mission's visit, the local authorities estimated that approximately 90,000 people were living in the valley.

The frequency and conditions of internal displacement always result in great tragedy and hardship for the families involved. But contrary to refugees abroad, displaced families never received any outside assistance.

Direct war damages are unevenly distributed. The highest density of destruction was recorded in the middle and lower parts of the Panjshir Valley, where the mission estimates that approximately 90% of all premises have been destroyed. The valley was riddled with bomb holes and wrecked military equipment. Because of the large number of former military installations there are many mine fields, and anti-personnel mines are claimed to have been sown in higher regions of the valley. The mission witnessed a large number of destroyed orchards and scattered trees which had either been cut, burnt, or had died owing to neglect. Agricultural land and the road leading through the valley had deteriorated owing to bomb holes, the use of heavy military vehicles and lack of maintenance during the four years of absence of the local population. However, it is important to note that Panjshir has never been a self-sufficient agricultural region: in the middle and lower parts of the valley, in particular, the population has always depended on Kabul and other major economic centres for its earnings.

The mission estimates at 80% the destruction level of villages in the lower Andarab Valley and around Bamiyan. The same rate applies to the entire Lakhawb Valley and to the region around Kilagay east of the Salang road.

In other regions military attacks seemed to have been directed more towards individual villages and specific locations rather than towards entire areas. These more localized destructions could be seen in the Anjuman Valley (South Badakhshan), in areas along the road leading to Keshem (Takhar and Western Badakhshan) and in several areas along the road from Tala to Shashpul (Baghlan/Bamiyan).

Fighting in and around the provincial capital of Bamiyan have, according to local estimates, resulted in the destruction of about 25% of all buildings. During a visit to the city the mission found the entire military compound and the administrative centre destroyed. Mine fields remain in and around former government and military installations (see annex II).

The mission also visited areas that were relatively spared from destruction, like the Warsaj Valley, the middle of the Andarab Valley, the Fereng Valley and the area around Kayan.

The prolonged war has also resulted in a very substantial reduction in the overall economic performance and of the well-being of the rural population. These indirect war effects can be summarized as follows:

- a general reduction in agricultural productivity, mainly due to the deterioration of seeds and to the lack of agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, draught animals and, to a certain extent, agricultural tools;

- a reduction in the number and quality of livestock, mainly due to losses caused by mines, to extensive sales and to animal diseases;

- short supplies of basic commodities resulting in high price increases;

- the collapse of all public services like road maintenance, health services and education;

- the absence of young people from their normal social and family structure, most of them having been directly involved in war activities.

The indirect consequences of the war are more difficult to assess, particularly since specific data is lacking. However, these effects are more evenly distributed, and affect the entire rural population.

Despite the sometimes devastating effects of the war and the overall deterioration in economic life, the mission observed that the traditional values and structures of Afghan society had remained lively. In trying circumstances these values had proved essential and the structures effective in protecting individual members of social groups from extreme hardship. Although the mission witnessed widespread poverty, it never came across signs of individual misery or severe malnutrition so often encountered in other developing countries.

Another consequence is the political partition of many of the regions visited. The mission often noted the presence of invisible borders within a geographically and ethnically homogeneous region.

Moreover, a whole generation of young people who emerged from childhood during the war has received almost no education, and has focused all its energy on war-related objectives. When peace returns the social re-integration of these young people will be a problem. They may have to face the future without proper professional skills in an environment which, as long as their country has not fully recovered, will offer few challenging possibilities.

3.2. The socioeconomic situation

Private housing

The ten years of armed conflict have resulted in enormous damage and destruction to private houses. Rebuilding and repairing private housing is one of the main priorities expressed to the mission. However, Afghans have already started to rebuild their houses wherever war activities have considerably diminished, either recently (Panjshir) or sufficiently long enough ago for the villagers to believe peace may be on its way (Khost).

Individual dwellings usually include private quarters as well as rooms for animals and for storage. The construction techniques and the materials used are relatively simple and well adapted to the rural environment. The walls of dwellings consist of either stone or mud and straw, or a combination of both. The roof is made of wooden beams with cross layers of wood planks covered with straw-enforced mud. Corrugated iron sheets are almost nonexistent and not at all adapted to the climate.

No nails, ropes or other materials are used. Labour is mainly provided by the house owner and his family; the only outside input comes from the carpenters and masons.

As a result of the strong demand for construction wood, prices have tripled and even quadrupled. A wooden beam 5-6 metres long used for roofs now costs 700.- to 1,500.- Afghanis; the highest price quoted was in the Panjshir valley where such beams were sold at Af.2,000.- each. The price fluctuations were directly related to the extent of local construction activities and the availability of wood resources. Transportation from other areas also has an influence on the prices.

For an average room, 12 to 15 such beams are necessary along with wood for roof planks, window frames and doors. The price of wood in the market will therefore most probably exceed the financial resources of the average farmer, not to mention those of a returnee family.

In these circumstances, village wood resources may be exhausted in areas where a great number of family dwellings require reconstruction. As these resources have already been decimated, the mission is very worried about the long-term effects of such extensive tree cuttings on the rural environment (see also Part 4 below).

In the mission's view, the only possible response to this situation is to import timber with the double objective of assisting in the rehabilitation of private habitat and protecting a fragile rural environment.

Doors and windows are made by carpenters whose work has to be paid for, often at a higher rate than the client's own income. They usually require about ten days to produce the windows and doors needed for an average family house. Their normal wage is between Af. 500.- and Af. 1,000.-. The cost of an average-sized room was estimated at approximately Af. 35,000.-.

Houses are traditionally built later in the year, usually after the harvest, just before winter. The standard rooms are about 3.5 m X 5 m. Each of them can be built in about 15 days, provided there is enough manpower and full time dedication.

As this is a very heavy and inevitable burden for every family concerned, and one which should be assumed without delay, the members of the mission have placed particular emphasis on the relevant needs and recommendations in the appropriate sections of this report. Nevertheless, it should be stressed that this problem could be solved by Afghans themselves, provided the main material required, wood, is provided in time.

Agriculture

Agriculture is the mainstay of the Afghan rural population. Even the "urbanized" population maintains close links to its agricultural bases and is well informed about the prevailing seasonal conditions and about their productive potential. Trade is closely related to, and forms an integral part of, the rural life. While some sections of the population eke out a meagre existence in climatically harsh and marginally productive high mountain valleys, most of the country people are concentrated in relatively protected valleys, where they practice intensive and diversified agriculture. Climactic conditions permitting, staple food production is supplemented by fruit and secondary crops.

The years of war have certainly had an impact on agricultural productivity -- military intervention has prevented or delayed field work; Kabul's control on the trade of seed and agricultural inputs (most importantly fertilizer) periodically resulted in substantially reduced yields; and lack of manpower has frequently left productive land underutilized or unexploited. Despite such adversities, the mission did not have the impression that the population's determination to maintain a high degree of self-sufficiency had faltered. In some areas, the mission did, indeed, observe that agricultural activities had been greatly reduced or even suspended, particularly where the population had been displaced for security reasons -- above all in the Lakhawb and the lower Andarab valleys (Baghlan), in the vicinity of military bases and installations, as well as around towns still under the control of the Government of Kabul. Elsewhere, however, the mission was astonished at the extent of agricultural activities and the apparent determination of the people to keep their land productive, even under deteriorating conditions. A similar impression was formed in

the lower valley of the Panjshir where villagers have only recently returned, and have immediately tackled the impressive task of reclaiming their fields.

While the mission had neither the means nor the mandate to accomplish in-depth assessments, it may be useful to the reader to share the impressions accumulated during the journey with respect to agricultural activity.

Above all, the mission was alerted throughout its itinerary to an irregular seasonal occurrence: a delayed onset of the winter season in 1987 followed by late and substantially reduced spring rains in 1988. With the exception of some areas in Wardak province where a diminished water runoff had reduced the irrigated acreage, other irrigated crops did not seem to have been adversely affected. Almost all people questioned, however, stated that rainfed cultures had produced substantially below-normal yields: these were reported as low as some 280 kg/hectare of wheat, and in some cases, outputs were even reported to be negative. Not all areas seem to have been equally severely affected by the reduced precipitation: in the Andarab valley, for instance, rainfed wheat crop yields were quoted at some 700 kg/hectare. These figures must, however, be reviewed with some caution, as their accuracy could not be tested. (The mission has attempted to develop a scenario reflecting the widespread yield reduction of rainfed crops in annex VI).

Local spokesmen pointed out that cereal and coarse grain prices had increased in comparison to the same period in 1987. (In annex III, the mission related cereal price increases to those of other commodities, and is inclined to conclude that they were in line with generally observed inflationary trends. It may, however, be conceivable that during this immediate post-harvest period, market forces have not yet fully responded to the impending cereal shortages predicted for spring 1989).

The extent of irrigated and rainfed cultivation varies from valley to valley, depending on the width of the river basins, the gradient of the surrounding mountain slopes and the proximity and availability of water sources. The mission observed that farmers distinctly preferred irrigated cultivation and had, over many years, developed fine and well adapted irrigation techniques. Despite the often impressive length of conveyor channels, rainfed cultures prevailed in the areas more distant from water sources, and above all where the technical and financial means of community did not allow the efficient exploitation of existing water resources.

Limited availability of irrigable agricultural land -- particularly in the extremely mountainous regions of Badakhshan and along the Hindu Kush divide -- and increasing population pressure has resulted in a disproportionate increase in rainfed cultivation, often in areas of marginal productivity. The mission estimates that over 60 % of the currently cultivated land surface is devoted to rainfed agriculture. This percentage varies substantially in favour of irrigated crops in valleys like that of the Khost-e-Doabi and the Andarab, but is

significantly higher in most up-river regions and narrow valleys with limited flat and irrigable areas. Food crops cultivated on rainfed fields may account for more than 50 % of the total production -- again subject to fluctuations due to geographical conditions.

The mission would like to draw attention to its observation that an alarming portion of rainfed crops are cultivated on steep slopes and land of questionable fertility. This land has only recently been put under cultivation, and already thin layers of top soil have been subjected to erosion, the effects of which are just beginning to make themselves felt. While terracing techniques are well known and applied for irrigated crops, similar investments have not been made for rainfed cultivations. Vegetative plant cover aimed at soil conservation is practically entirely absent or has been destroyed by freely roaming animal herds. If counter measures are not urgently introduced, the resulting increase in environmental damage will lead irreversibly to a population extensively dependent on external support.

Orchards and utility wood resources have sustained extensive damage, perhaps exceeding that of field crops: some have been burned, others entirely destroyed, and many have died or been permanently weakened by neglect. The mission also witnessed an increasing tendency towards over-exploitation: the population continuously depleted existing resources in order to reconstruct shelters and meet its demand for heating and firewood. A few isolated fruit tree plantations were observed, as well as some sparsely spread forests, particularly in the Bamiyan valley, where fast-growing trees were even cultivated under irrigation. The mission notes with concern, however, that no significant efforts have yet been made to renew the dwindling resources in the areas visited.

Livestock assets had diminished during the war as a result of aggression as well as the unopposed spread of animal diseases, which had taken a disproportionately high toll. Throughout its journey, the mission was made aware of a high incidence of infectious diseases like newcastle, foot-and-mouth, and anthrax as well as parasitic illnesses. Veterinary services were practically nonexistent, and there seemed to be no structure whose revival could improve the situation. The mission was also informed that even before the war, veterinary services were rare and never reached the remote areas along the mission's itinerary.

Public services

Among the main priorities of local authorities is the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the road networks in their respective regions. The mission devoted particular attention to this issue and reported its findings in section 3.3. below.

Other public services are in bad shape. War, lack of maintenance and scarce equipment have rendered health services and the education system almost inoperative; their rehabilitation and reinstitution should be attended to urgently.

In the valleys of the Andarab and Khost-Fereng, health services are practically nonexistent. In the Panjshir and Keshem regions such services exist but are insufficient. In Shashpul and Jeghatu, on the other hand, services are well organized but cannot cope with the demand. The regions are all understaffed, under-equipped and have little or no resources, and therefore rely extensively on external support.

The mission visited four health centres along with the administrative centres responsible for service support in each region, namely in the Panjshir Valley, Kayan, Shashpul and Jeghatu. Details on their organization can be found in Annex II. In addition, the mission gathered information in Keshem, where the hospital is trying to recover from the recent fighting which took place in the city. It also visited the empty premises of the hospital of Bamiyan city (see Annex II).

For the time being major efforts seem to be directed towards surgical interventions, particularly to treat mine victims and other traumatic cases. The mission identified the need for surgical theatres, X-ray equipment, laboratories and dental equipment as well as a general need for medicine.

Vaccination campaigns have been undertaken only in the areas of Jeghatu and part of the north-eastern region. Sanitation, although strikingly poor, is not among the priorities of the populations met, and the same low priority rating applies to mother and child care.

The rural population does not consider education a very high priority, and educational systems have never been well established, even in times of peace. A decade of war has now produced a generation of teenagers and young men who have devoted their attention to war without acquiring the skills needed for times of peace.

Almost everywhere, school premises have been destroyed or are used for other purposes. Community efforts towards their reconstruction and rehabilitation are not easy to mobilize, and the administrative structures are not adequate for the organization of appropriate measures.

The only educational structure which the mission noted almost everywhere was the madrassas, or religious schools. These are organized by the Mullahs, usually in the mosques. Although most of them seem to be devoted to the religious education of boys only, there were also places where girls sat in, particularly in Kayan and Wardak.

The few existing regular school programmes are above all the fruit of small group efforts and of the contribution of voluntary teachers, some of whom might have undergone specific training a long time ago and others who had only completed primary or secondary schooling before the war.

Education must be tackled from scratch. There is no specific rehabilitation/reconstruction programme, no adequate or nationwide curriculum, no school materials and equipment, no financial resources, insufficient staff and no concrete initiative apart from modest efforts made in the Shura-e-Nazar zone and, especially, in Jeghatu.

3.3 LOGISTICS

In conformity with its overall objectives, the mission chose and agreed upon its itinerary in consultation with respective local authorities controlling the area. The trajectory usually reflected the safest and shortest routing, and generally avoided disputed areas. The means of transport were those routinely and locally available. By necessity, this implied that the mission travelled extensively along the routes -- and by the same or similar means -- used by the Afghan resistance.

The north-eastern province of Badakhshan is accessible by motor vehicle exclusively through Takhar province along the Kunduz-Faizabad road. This thoroughfare extends beyond Faizabad to Top-khana, near the Dorah pass which marks the border with Pakistan. Until recently, the pass had been controlled by the Kabul Government. Even once the road has been cleared of mines it will need to be surveyed before it can be used by trucks, since difficult terrain is said to exist on both sides of the border.

The mission travelled by car along a section of the Taloqan-Keshem road. Originally gravelled and about six metres wide, it is now in a badly neglected state, with most of its foundation structure destroyed. It is often deeply rutted, and long sections are soft and covered with thick layers of dust, making passage in wet conditions difficult and hazardous. Roadside ditches are completely silted or have disappeared. 4 x 4-wheel-drive personal vehicles and 3-axle rear-wheel-drive trucks currently use the road, and may travel at an average speed of about 20 kmh in dry and favourable conditions. No maintenance and reconstruction work had been done to this road. Instead, frequent ad hoc and rough deviations across adjacent terrain had been built as a means of bypassing the worst stretches.

From this thoroughfare, a few feeder roads branch off into valleys. To the extent to which the mission had access to them, they were found to be in somewhat better shape, a fact which bore witness to their lesser strategic importance and to the maintenance or repair activities undertaken by the local authorities. These roads generally follow their valley upstream and taper off into horse tracks or footpaths.

The three-metre-wide feeder road south through Farkhar into the southern part of Takhar province is passable by 2 x 2-wheel-drive trucks as far as Piu, some 30 kilometers beyond Warsaj (a broken-down bridge currently impedes passage). It features occasional steep gradients and deep river crossings which can render the road temporarily impassable in snow and ice and during the spring runoff. Access to areas beyond that point and to neighbouring valleys, including the river baAt the tracks into these areas exist, but they cross steep and unimproved mountain passes at altitudes exceeding 4,000 meters. At times they have constituted the only possible access to Pakistan: over the Hindu Kush divide, which itself exceeds 5,300 metres at its lowest passage (the Kafir-Khotal). While these routes have been frequently travelled and extensively used by the resistance for their supplies, the mission is not convinced that they should be recommended for an organized and continuous supply of inputs for relief and rehabilitation activities in Badakhshan province. Besides, this route is normally closed from November to July.

The provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz, Samangan and Takhar are readily accessible via the Kabul-Dushanbe and the Kabul-Hairatan roads, both northward extensions of the Salang highway. Though the mission travelled only a short distance along this route (in Baghlan province), it was informed that the whole length was in similar condition. The tarmac road has apparently been well maintained and heavy trucks use it throughout the year; truck/trailer combinations are not common, but according to local sources they are able to negotiate the entire length of the highway.

Two important gravelled routes branch to the west, into the valleys of the Doshi towards Doab and the Ghorband, to join Bamiyan province to the Salang highway. Interconnected through the valley of the Shikari, the southward passage over the Hajigak pass (3,300 m.) leads into the provinces of Wardak and Ghazni and serves as an important alternative logistic link between the central-north and southern provinces. Most bridges along this route have collapsed, but remain viable for careful crossings. Except during the winter months, when the Hajigak pass becomes inaccessible, 4 x 6 wheel trucks negotiate the narrow valleys and steep rugged terrain, with many hairpin bends, carrying up to 15 metric tons per truck.

To the east of the Salang highway, two dead-end gravel roads lead into the valleys of the Andarab and the Panjshir. The latter is motorable up to Dasht-e-Rivat; from there, an extension beyond Paryan is currently under construction which will eventually link up with the Anjuman valley. The existing road is bad, however, and passage is at times impeded by destroyed bridges and heavy wreckage. Upstream and to the north, some construction work has also been undertaken between Khawak and Samandan, over the Kotal Khawak, with a view to linking the Andarab valley to the Panjshir valley.

In the vicinity of trading centres and larger settlements, some transport facilities are available. Their number has recently increased as administrative centres and military installations have fallen into the hands of the resistance. The mission observed substantial numbers of civilian trucks, particularly in the vicinity of the arterial roads. According to the local population, more rolling stock is available in the provincial capitals, particularly Kunduz and Taloqan.

Depending on the prevailing security and political situation, truck drivers are accepting cargo for transportation beyond their immediate area of political, tribal or ethnic affiliation. The further away the desired destinations, the more likely it is, however, that neighbouring traders and political entities will demand their share of the transport contract, either by insisting on reloading the cargo on to their own trucks, or by imposing tolls on transit cargo (fees in excess of Afs. 100,000 per truck and per toll gate have been reported). It has hitherto been quite common, for instance, for cargo from the Pakistan border to Tala (valley of the Doshi), along the alternate route through Ghazni, Wardak and Bamiyan provinces, to be reloaded up to five times if no prior transit agreements have been reached. Even with such agreements , at least two reloadings are reported necessary. It has been suggested that the use of the main highways would eliminate reloading requirements; this assumes, however, the status quo, or that the respective parties controlling the highways in the future would adhere to a free passage agreement (still to be negotiated).

While the mission -- optimistically -- hopes that such concessions can indeed be reached, it must be pointed out that some compensation of local traders or proportionate contractual participation will most probably be necessary in order to make any such passage agreement stick.

In the light of these factors, it is perhaps not surprising that the prevailing transport rates vary greatly, reflecting cumulatively (but inseparably): capital and operational costs, political and safety factors, and some "insurance risk" as truck drivers are generally held responsible for their load until delivery. Prices are therefore subject to fluctuation in response to any of the above parameters. For orientation purposes only, the mission noted transport costs of between 85 and 200 Afs*. per ton/km, discounting two quotations in excess of 400 Afs. By way of comparison, the cost of alternative transport by horse has been quoted at at least ten times the truck rate.

* US$ 1 =	Af 180	(in force monney market in Peshawar and inside Afghanistan)
	Af 55	(official exchange rate of the time of the mission)

During the return journey to Pakistan the mission crossed the provinces of Ghazni and Paktika along one of the supply routes that is currently extensively used in spite of the difficulties involved.

The mission did not notice any large storage facilities along its itinerary -- these are said to exist predominantly in provincial capitals. One bullet-riddled warehouse in Keshem (Badakhshan) had fallen into disuse, but could be rehabilitated to serve temporarily as storage space for commodities and other relief items. Assuming unskilled storage practices, some 2,000 tons of bagged cereal grains could be accommodated. In Bamiyan province, traditional and well-built storage facilities are available and currently used by the population. Some spare capacity may be available on a seasonal basis when community stocks are low. It should be noted that these facilities are currently used for bulk storage of grain, with between five and nine 50-ton silo chambers per unit. In addition -- and pending the consent and co-operation of the local communities -- mosques and other community or private structures may be made accessible for the temporary storage of relief and rehabilitation items.

If necessary, and whenever storage facilities in provincial administrative centres are not adequate or accessible, the erection of prefabricated structures should provide sufficient capacity. Under dry weather conditions, prevailing during much of the summer until early winter, outside storage is possible and not generally prone to security risks. The mission does not therefore see the currently limited storage capacity as an obstacle to any realistic relief and rehabilitation programme.

At the time of the visit, fuels and oils were available in sufficient quantities along the motorable routes to meet the existing demand (diesel is easier to obtain than petrol). Fuel is either "imported" from Kabul or other administrative centres under the control of the GOA, recovered from military installations taken over by the Mujahedin, or tapped directly from the pipeline along the Salang road. It is obvious that the supply line is fragile and temporary: in any case, it is not permanent and reliable. Prices vary between 30 - 60 Afs. per litre of diesel and 50 - 100 Afs. per litre of petrol. With few exceptions, fuels are stored in 200-litre barrels at roadside outlets in the vicinity of bazaars
(see Annex II).

Less frequently, roadside workshops and maintenance facilities can be found; these are furnished with a minimum of equipment and occasionally have some spare parts. The astounding ingenuity of the mechanical staff is the prime factor in the continuing serviceability of most of the rolling stock.

3.4 Political context

3.4.1 Introduction

The different segments of the population which rebelled against the central power have become progressively more affiliated to the political parties whose headquarters are either in Pakistan or in Iran. The process has its own dynamics which this report does not propose to analyze. It might be useful, however, to outline its main characteristics:

This movement has led to the emergence of "new elites" whose legitimacy, when it is recognized, constitutes a factor of stability in their respective zones of influence.

These new elites generally represent one or other of the political parties based abroad, but there are exceptions (cf. Mawlawi Afzal, Engineer Hashemi).

The process of affiliation of these "new elites" with the political parties has its own dynamics, and has not yet been entirely completed.

These are generally lasting affiliations, but here again, there are exceptions (cf. Baz. Mohamed, Qazi Amin Wardak).

The geographical establishment of the parties within Afghanistan depends on several factors, among which the ethnic and/or religious element plays a significant role.

The populations are more willing to identify with the local commander than with the party, and when there is a change of affiliation, the entire population follows.

Not all parties share the same approach to civilian society.

The boundaries of the various zones of influence are not fixed, but with the exception of Hazarajat (cf. NASR-SHURA conflict) they are tending towards a certain stability.

The Alliance of Peshawar Parties seems to have a fair amount of influence within the country (apart from Hazarajat), but the parties are very obviously autonomous.

The amount of leeway given by the parties to their commanders to establish their own alliances within the country varies.

The safety of persons and property in the zones outside the control of Kabul is ensured, in principle, by the local commanders.

The possibility or impossibility of travelling within a given zone depends on the local commanders and on the policy of their respective parties. With a few rare exceptions, these policies tend to be tolerant, but with stricter control for armed convoys.

Finally, the traditional structures, far from being weakened, were in fact reinforced both by the direct and the indirect effects of the war. The participation of the commanders in the local assemblies, now considered natural, has meant that these councils have become the indispensable forum for the discussion of any activities concerning civilian society.

3.4.2 The zones of influence crossed

The mission crossed eight zones of influence of varying importance and homogeneity:

The "Republic of Nuristan", to the north of Barg-e-Matal, whose chief is Mawlawi Afzal (second day of the journey);

The "Shura-e-Nazar" zone (Supervisory Council), Commander Massoud's zone of influence. The mission entered this zone on 9.10.88 at the summit of the Kafir Kohtal (Badakhshan) and left it on 5.11.88 at Deh Sallah (Baghlan);

A zone of influence of the Hezb-e-Islami (G.Hekmatyar) which includes the lower Andarab Valley, the Khinjan Region, the foothills to the east of the tarmac road up to the approaches to the Kelagai base, and the Larkwawb Valley (5 to 8.11.88);

Commander Sayyed Esamuddin Haqbin's zone of influence (Ismaelians), from the Kelagai Plain to the town of Tala (9 to 11.11.88);

The zone of influence of Baz Mohamad from Barfak to the approaches of Shashpul (11 and 12.11.88).

The Shashpul-Bamiyan zone (from 12.11 to 14.11.88)

The zone of influence of the Shiite parties from Kalu (Bamiyan) to Tezak (Maidan/Wardak) (15.11.88).

The zone of influence of Qazi Amin Wardak from Tangi-Wardak to south-west of Ghazni (from 16 to 19.11.88).

The geographical locations provided simply represent the places through which the mission passed. The passage from one zone to another is not always very precise, with the exception of the Ismaelian zone, which is separated from the Hezb-e-Islami zone to the east by the tarmac road only and from the Baz-Mohammad zone to the west by a no man's land between Tala and Barfak.

These transition zones are generally posted alternately by the different parties who either share the territory (eg. alternation of the Jamiat and Hezb-e-Islami posts between Deh-Sallah and Khinjan) or conclude local pacts or alliances (eg. Harrakat-e-Enqeleb, Harrakat-e-Islami, Jamiat and Mahaz-e-Milli between Doab-e-Mekhzarin and Shashpul).

The Shashpul-Bamiyan zone, where all of the parties which contributed to the abandonment by Kabul of the provincial capital of Bamiyan are to be found -- the Shiites alongside the Sunnites and the Hazaras alongside the Tadjiks and the Pashtouns -- provides a good illustration of these local arrangements.

The zone of influence of the Shiite parties, on the other hand, is exclusively Shiite, and had been subject to increasing tensions due to internal conflicts in the regions of Behsud, Dan-e-Aodullah and Nawur.

The areas from Tezak and Tangi-Wardak essentially alternate between Hezb-e-Islami (Khales), Hezb-e-Islami (G. Hekmatyar), Harrakat-e-Enqelab and Harrakat-e-Islami, to name only those parties whose emblems were visible from the route followed.

3.4.3 Military structures and civilian society

While it is not possible to deal properly with this particularly complex subject simply on the basis of the observations made during the mission, a simplified outline of the existing situations could be useful:

- military structure(s) interacting with civilian society (societies) in an effort to contribute to the reconstruction of the country;

- existence of civilian society, but no visible signs of the existence of a military structure;

- military structure(s) and civilian society (societies) coexisting, but lack of constructive dialogue between them.

- existence of a military structure, but civilian society no longer exists.

This last case is well illustrated by the Hezb-e-Islami (G. Hekmatyar) zone of influence. Practically the entire population has gone into exile, and the "Mujahedins" have set up camp in the ruins. Moreover, a number of these Mujahedins are not originally from the region -- for example Commander Nazatyar, a recent arrival originally from Ghorband (Parwan), and by whom the mission was particularly well received.

The Bamiyan zone is a good illustration of the third of the above-mentioned cases in that according to the information gathered, the military commanders seem content to meet twice a month to tackle everyday problems without broaching the long-term problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation. An exception must be made for Engineer Hashemi, who is constrained by lack of funds to work on a small scale.

The only area in which the second case was observed is the Republic of Nuristan -- and it must be recalled that the mission crossed only the northern part of this zone where the population density is very low.

The first of the above cases is by far the most interesting and the most encouraging, but it occurs in a variety of forms depending on the regions and the parties.

In the Shura-e-Nazar region, for example, the military structure has tended to generate an administrative, pseudo-State structure, with a number of committees akin to ministries in power -- so there is a technocratic-type approach from above, more concerned with the large-scale infrastructural projects (within reasonable limits) than with the immediate needs of the populations. Thus, the priorities expressed by the village councils or at the meetings of the "Grey Beards" seemed much more realistic than the ambitions expressed by individual committee heads. In a way, this is yet another example of the distance between civilian society and centralized power which has always characterized Afghanistan. It should be pointed out, however, that all of the non-military committees are recent, and that unlike the military commanders whose legitimacy dates back eight years, the committee heads are new, unknown to most of the populations, and often foreign to the region.

Offsetting this approach is the approach adopted in the Qazi Amin Wardak zone of influence which places more emphasis on private initiative. The projects which have taken shape are essentially pilot projects whose results are immediately perceptible for the local population. People are free to accept or refuse to reproduce them in their villages, but they must assume in full or in part the burden of the initial investment. These projects, which aim at increasing agricultural productivity (new types of swing-ploughs, mini-tractors, specially designed threshers, poultry farming units), inevitably meet with initial wariness. The farmers may or may not accept the idea, and the only constraint is that once they have accepted an idea they become responsible for it. Patient efforts in this respect have already been under way for years, and they are beginning to bear fruit.

Between these two models there is undoubtedly a whole range of variations which this mission did not have the chance to observe -- except perhaps at Shashpul, where Engineer Hashemi's efforts are akin to those of Amin Wardak, and at Kayan, more reminiscent of the Shura-e-Nazar model.

So on the one hand, there is a power close to the concerns of civilian society but limited in space, and on the other hand, there is a power which is geographically widespread, but which tends to stay aloof from civilian society. It should be pointed out, however, that in neither case does the military structure encroach on civilian society, and that in principle, there is no requisitioning by commanders. The only exceptions to this rule are the regions which are either poorly controlled or under authoritarian rule, where civilian society puts up with the practice more than it accepts it.

3.4.4 Relations between zones of influence

This point has already been outlined in the introduction to this chapter. The mission was not able to gather many objective elements needed to develop this topic. However, the general impression was that these relations depended partly on the local commanders -- a fact which accounts for their tendency to fluctuate -- and partly on instructions issued by the parties in Peshawar (or Iran), but that in some cases at least (Andarab), these struggles for political influence were not necessarily appreciated by the populations.

3.4.5 Role of the Kabul Government

As already mentioned, the regions through which the mission travelled showed no indications of direct control from the capital. Kabul's influence is felt, however, through indirect control at the economic level. The controlled shortage of selected seeds and fertilizers and the selective supply of consumer goods (wheat, sugar, tea, petrol and fuel etc. ...) has a direct impact on agricultural production, on the cost of living and hence on inflation, the causes of which are numerous. The fact that in a year of poor harvest, according to information gathered by the mission, the price of wheat fell in Kunduz and rose in Kabul, while even during the years of good harvest since the beginning of the war the region could not cover its own needs, is reminiscent of a "carrot and stick policy".

If the United Nations were to limit itself to covering artificial deficits, it would run the risk of contributing to the efficiency of a policy aimed at dividing the country and its populations.

But Kabul's influence is also felt in another sphere, a sphere which is much more delicate to comprehend in that it concerns the relations between the zones of influence: it is always possible for Kabul to favour one region to the detriment of another, thereby accentuating rifts between them and fueling internal conflicts.

3.4.6 Evolution of the situation: a few scenarios

The purpose of this exercise is not to predict the future of a situation which is impossible to comprehend, but at the very most to examine the changes on which United Nations assistance would depend. If the importance of the stable zones of influence were to increase, the task of the United Nations would

inevitably be simplified -- provided they were granted access to those zones. This would of course largely depend on inter-zonal relations, and hence indirectly on the attitude of the Government.

If on the other hand the zones of influence were to fall apart, giving way to transitory zones under alternating party control, the task would become extremely long, complex, costly and hazardous -- to which must be added the risk of any assistance becoming counterproductive.

In the mixed zones, where the alternation of parties is merely a sign of diversity rather than competition, United Nations assistance should be considered only if freedom of movement is guaranteed, either through local pacts or by a higher authority. This authority should be the Alliance of Peshawar Parties, provided this Alliance is in a position fully to assume this role throughout Afghanistan. Transit through Hazarajat will remain a problem as long as the question of the representation of the Shiite parties has not been resolved.

The freedom of movement for humanitarian aid convoys is one of the prerequisites for efficient United Nations assistance.

3.4.7 The risks involved in external assistance

All types of external assistance, whether multilateral or bilateral, private or public, involve enormous risks. Because of the country's current fragmentation, all external aid carries with it the risk of fueling the centrifugal forces and creating insuperable rifts. External aid provides resources and liquidities which are not generated by the local economy. If these liquidities are not counterbalanced, the resulting liquidity increase and economic disorganization will tend to cause inflation. External aid is limited in time. If it does not aim to rebuild a healthy economy capable of generating its own resources, the non-productive superstructure which has been built will simply result in debts, the burden of which will have to be supported by the rural community.

If owing to a poor understanding of the political balance this assistance is simply provided to all those who claim to need it, and does not conform with a coherent rehabilitation/reconstruction policy, it may very well fuel the process of fragmentation within the country. Even if some of these risks must be anticipated by the Afghans themselves, the United Nations cannot ignore them when drawing up their

assistance programmes. In order to limit them as much as possible, the international institution must co-ordinate its activities in order to avoid tripping over its own feet. The diversity of Afghanistan must be tackled with the unity of the United Nations.

4. United Nations assistance framework

4.1 Priority needs

The Afghan people have already identified their priorities. The mission recorded the opinions expressed by local authorities such as Mujahedin commanders, reconstruction committee members and "Grey Beards" as well as by simple individuals met in different regions. The main needs based on this assessment are reflected in the following priority approach:

Food and seeds: The main priority in the minds of the people met is certainly the need for both food commodities (mainly wheat) and seeds (particularly improved wheat varieties).

Shelter: Depending on the local level of destruction, there are areas where great emphasis is put on the need for the reconstruction of private dwellings, particularly for the sake of displaced persons and refugees who are already or will be returning home.

Agricultural support: In relation to the improvement of the food production capacity, and therefore to the recovery of the agricultural sector, there is an urgent need for the reconstruction/repair of irrigation channels (including the improvement of existing ones in regions where yields can be increased so that future crops can cover requirements in neighbouring regions - e.g. Andarab and Khost-Fereng in the province of Baghlan.

Infrastructure: Great emphasis should be placed on the improvement, repair, reconstruction and building up of an adequate road network. As for the reconstruction of public buildings, it is important to note that health facilities require a specific assessment, and schools should be rebuilt in the context of an integrated education programme.

4.2 Absorption capacity:

It is obvious that the timely delivery of food, seeds, building materials etc. depends on an adequate logistic system which should include a reliable road network and storage capacity. The existing network has already been used for the war effort and has proved to be useful. However, relief goods will certainly represent a far larger volume than military items

and will probably be more burdensome to handle. For the efficient delivery of any large-scale rehabilitation assistance and for the promotion of internal economic activities, repair of main arterial roads is of paramount importance.

One can envisage the participation of the community members through "food-for-work" schemes, but it is imperative to ensure that indispensable public servants such as engineers, technicians or skilled workers receive a regular cash income. For the time being the financial resources of all local authorities encountered are so scarce that it is impossible to imagine that they will be able to cover the minimum public expense involved.

The handiwork required for the building of private houses (i.e. chiefly masons and carpenters) should also be remunerated, although it is possible to envisage a half-in-kind/half-cash payment procedure. Food-for-work may constitute an attractive alternative to them, not only because it reduces cash requirements, but also because it increases locally available food supplies.

Health facilities are scarce, and there is almost no basic equipment. The main problem, however, is the absence of properly trained physicians and nurses, without whom it is hazardous to design an assistance programme in the health field.

Most schools have either been destroyed or are used for purposes other than teaching. Reconstruction and rehabilitation of premises is essential, but there is an even greater need for an articulate education programme and for the supply of related equipment and materials. Resources should therefore suffice to ensure both the setting up of this educational framework and the payment of an adequate income to the imperatively required skilled personnel.

In this respect, one thing is clear: the services currently provided are very meagre and the reception/absorption capacity of the existing infrastructure is extremely low. Besides, the mission noted that female public servants or beneficiaries are almost totally absent from all public services visited. Services such as health centres (with some exceptions in Kayan, Shashpul and Jeghatu) often do not have a department for female patients, while the vast majority of schools are devoted to the exclusive education of boys and young men.

Economic and social impact of assistance programmes: Assistance programmes may have a meaningful impact on people's consumption capacity. There will probably be new possibilities for local employment within the framework of assistance programmes, and both the economic and the social structures could then undergo rapid change.

The prevailing socioeconomic structures can benefit from technical inputs and new skills, but only if these are introduced at the grassroots level. For the local population to accept these innovations, it is necessary to proceed step by step until the people concerned are aware of their effectiveness. It is pointless to introduce production models which the local people cannot sustain without external assistance.

Any assistance programme planned from above without taking into consideration the knowledge and the wishes of the population concerned, would probably dramatically disrupt a very fragile but remarkably effective socioeconomic system which has survived through the centuries in spite of some superficial changes. The people concerned should participate in both the planning and the implementation phases of any assistance programme in order to guarantee effective results, to avoid the emergence of the so-called "dependency syndrome" and to ensure the local population's highly motivated support.

4.3. Planning and implementation of assistance programmes

Impact of the war situation: The war is not over, and its direct and indirect consequences are still felt everywhere. For the time being, no assistance programme can be implemented without being jeopardized by war activities.

Political context in which planning and implementation would take place: One of the main consequences of the war is, of course, the lack of a national political consensus. It is therefore imperative to deal with numerous groups which often disagree with the UN's working relationships with other Afghan elements. Rivalries and even direct fighting between them could prevent the UN from attaining its objectives. It is also important for the UN to come to an agreement on modes of assistance and to be strict with regard to their application. (e.g. movement of convoys, security of local and international UN staff members etc.)

Local administrative organization: Each group has a local administration, the organization of which varies considerably from one place to another. In some areas, in spite of their narrowness (or perhaps because of it), there is a rather efficient administrative organization which has already permitted the launching of small but successful development programmes. In others, despite a basically well designed administration, the lack of resources is an obstacle to the existence of a reliable structure at this stage. Finally, there are still many places where the war-oriented infrastructure is the only reliable one.

Implementing partners: In these circumstances, programme implementing authorities require very strong financial support in order to strengthen their administrative capacity (e.g. basic infrastructure, personnel, training, equipment etc.). The UN system and the NGOs should participate in this endeavour by providing concrete support in close co-operation with the implementing partners.

Accessibility from neighboring countries: Afghanistan being a landlocked country, any large-scale assistance programme will depend on supplies brought in from one of its neighboring countries. On the basis of the mission's findings, the only reliable current alternative routes to the main highway linking the city of Herat to Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif or Jalalabad via Kandahar and Ghazni are very hazardous. Depending on this single option may undermine future assistance efforts.

Monitoring difficulties: As mentioned in the Preface, Afghanistan and its people form a very complex reality, difficult for any foreigner to understand. Similarly, UN bureaucracy, donors' reporting requirements and other complex administrative requisites linked to UN assistance are obscure notions for most Afghans. Therefore, the monitoring of assistance programmes will require both a lot of flexibility and a very visible but also highly respected and fully accepted UN presence on the spot. The mission believes that the monitoring of UN assistance projects should be undertaken on the basis of a close inter-agency co-operation. Instead of having one staff member per agency in a given area, one of them could be fully briefed by other organizations concerned so that he would be able to ensure accurate monitoring on behalf of all of the UN agencies involved.

4.4 Assistance framework.

A word of caution: On the basis of observations made in the areas visited by the mission, it seems advisable to envisage experimental assistance programmes, easy to reproduce elsewhere and based on the private effort as well as on a decentralized administrative/logistical infrastructure.

Measures of preparation prior to the return of refugees and displaced persons: Most of the regions visited by the mission did not generate refugees; some were abandoned by most of their inhabitants, who sought refuge in Kabul and other regions within Afghanistan. Hence, this issue should be considered in the light of a limited approach based mainly on observations made in the Lakhawb Valley and along the road between Kilagay and Doshi (almost devoid of any civilian population, since most of the inhabitants are now in Pakistan), as well as on the prevailing situation in Panjshir where the massive return of internally displaced persons already warrants the support of a UN assistance programme.

The observations made do not allow the mission to foresee any specific trend for future refugee repatriation movements. Considering that nobody concerned would predict any massive return before the departure of foreign troops and that it will take some time for the Afghans to be convinced or to admit that this has been achieved, one can assume that no massive repatriation involving several hundreds of thousands of refugees will start as soon as next Spring. The return of refugees may be viewed as a step by step operation which will take place on a regional basis, in conformity with agreements between the refugees themselves , the chiefs of the parties, the relevant commanders and the traditional leaders. Return movements will most probably not rely on international assistance, and will take place along the same routes that led the refugees to their countries of asylum.

In this respect, it seems reasonable to suggest that the best measures of preparation prior to the return of refugees and displaced persons should be considered within the framework of assistance activities related to the supply/production of food as well as to the reconstruction of private dwellings and the rehabilitation of the agricultural sector and of the basic public infrastructure.

<u>Assistance schemes</u>: One of the main tools which might allow the UN system to respond efficiently to the challenges offered by any assistance programme in Afghanistan is probably to be found in the <u>food-for-work schemes</u>. In addition, UN projects have to be implemented in collaboration with the most appropriate local civilian administration available, i.e. the reconstruction committees, wherever they exist, or the traditional local councils (at the village, district or provincial level) known as Shuras in the northern region and Jirgas in the tribal areas.

On the basis of the four main priorities identified, the assistance schemes proposed can be summarized as follows:

a. <u>Food and seeds</u>

<u>In the very short term</u> (within the coming few weeks or months), the shortage of food due to the low rainfall as well as any new demand related to the arrival of returnees require a dual approach: firstly, the supply of food commodities; secondly, the supply of seeds and fertilizers to help increase the local food production. Given the prevailing conditions in the country, this should be done with a lot of care. Projects geared to the free distribution of commodities should be of the shortest possible duration. Food-for-work projects should start at the earliest possible stage. Besides, short-term projects should allow the UN to evaluate the local project implementation capacity. Therefore, the fielding of assessment missions simultaneously with (or if possible before) the launching of any assistance project is strongly recommended. <u>In the longer term</u>, food-for-work schemes and local market support should ensure the return to a normal food production system. Corrections/improvements ought to be proposed by further evaluation missions.

Food and seed projects should be implemented in all regions visited, since everywhere dry crops were below average or nonexistent.

b. Private Dwellings

As many wooden beams as possible should be provided through external assistance, and the Afghans themselves will take care of all the rest. However, the reconstruction process is time-consuming and all people concerned will always be short of time. Therefore, food-for-work projects should ensure full-time dedication to the reconstruction of private dwellings, so that enough time for agricultural, handicraft or other food/cash generating activities will be available subsequently. This will also reduce the scope of free food distribution programmes.

Areas where dwelling reconstruction projects are to be implemented can be identified according to the extent of the damage: Firstly, areas severely affected by the war, i.e. the Panjshir and Lakhawb valleys as well as the villages along the Salang Highway. Secondly, the areas in the lower Anjuman and the Maghnaul valleys where important destruction has taken place. Thirdly, areas where the presence of military garrisons and other war targets has resulted in heavy fighting (i.e. towns and villages in Bamiyan, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakshan), causing the departure of the local population.

c. Rehabilitation of the agricultural sector

The clearing, maintenance and construction of irrigation channels is essential for the rehabilitation and improvement of the agricultural sector. Here again, food-for-work schemes represent a most attractive option, and one which should ensure effective and timely results. Motorized means and sophisticated tools are not recommended: in addition to the delicate introduction procedures required they could, if introduced on a large scale, reduce the number of income generating activities available. At this stage, the chief requirements are Afghan labour and hand tools. The areas concerned are the same as for the housing reconstruction projects.

The rehabilitation and further development of the agricultural sector also require the implementation of projects providing improved seeds, fertilizers and agricultural tools (including, although with some reservations, small motorized appliances). These projects may be based on an assistance scheme involving either the subsidised selling of goods and tools, credit arrangements or even community ownership of all items. With regard to the mechanical appliances, it is important to note that, as would be the case for any unknown technical input, these should be introduced on a trial basis through small pilot projects which could last for a long period of time before they prove to be an asset, thereby convincing the population. Such projects should be implemented in all regions visited by the mission.

The main scheme for the redevelopment of orchards and the reafforestation of areas affected by the war should be based on the establishment of as many nurseries as possible. These should be placed under the responsibility of the communities directly concerned -- perhaps the village level would be the most appropriate. Again, tree stands and orchard assistance activities concern all regions visited.

As far as livestock is concerned, the first step must be the fielding of a technical mission which should carefully assess the situation, since this mission's findings are very superficial. However, it seems obvious that there is an urgent need for the establishment of some sort of a veterinary service: the herds have been affected by many diseases, and once this problem has been overcome, new breeds will have to be brought in. In this context, the supply of oxen could be considered in order to increase draught power, although people met during the mission seemed to put far less emphasis on this requirement than many observers in Peshawar do. Finally, one should note that great improvements can be introduced easily as far as poultry is concerned. Livestock is an important resource everywhere and assistance programmes should be implemented in all regions visited, since they all share the same difficulties.

d. Public infrastructure

Some local authorities are trying to repair/rebuild at least part of the existing basic public infrastructure. Above all they are concentrating their efforts on the road network. They have almost no financial means, and the work is often done with hand tools and explosives only. Any assistance programme to be implemented in Afghansitan will therefore have to provide some of these authorities with at least the minimum mechanical appliances they need (bulldozers, cranes etc.). However, these must be identified by a qualified UN technical team which should also identify those local institutions which might become the UN implementing partners. For the time being one can only suggest a few areas where this sort of project might be implemented: Jeghatu, Shashpul, Panjshir, Warsaj/Farkhar and Anjuman/Maghnaul.

As regards public health, it should be noted that hospitals and clinics/dispensaries must be almost fully equipped and often repaired in Panjshir, Shashpul/Bamiyan, Keshem, and to a lesser extent, Jeghatu. They have to be rebuilt or built in almost all other areas visited except Kayan, where it seems that better equipment would suffice. Everywhere, there is an urgent need for skilled personnel and particularly female physicians and nurses.

Education: It is obvious that hundreds of schools have to be rebuilt or rehabilitated, but the mission can hardly recommend a concrete assistance scheme at this stage. In addition to the school buildings, there is an urgent need for well-adapted education programmes which must differentiate between the needs of the 5 to 15-year-old generation and those of the young people who were affected in different ways by the war during their school age, i.e. the 15 to 30-year-old group. This issue needs a far more careful assessment, which ought to be carried out by the Afghan institutions concerned, in co-operation with the relevant UN organizations. Lack of financial and staff resources cannot be addressed without a proper in-depth assessment of the situation. Specialized UN teams should therefore undertake relevant technical missions with a view to drawing up concrete project proposals (see Annex V).

e. Other activities.

- De-mining: Mine fields should be cleared up or at least made inaccessible. The programmes geared to the training of refugees in Pakistan are not known to the local authorities encountered -- they should perhaps be extended inside Afghansitan. For de-mining purposes it is possible to count on some people who either have some relevant knowhow (Shashpul, Panjshir) or are ready to be trained; but the Afghans concerned deplore the general lack of appropriate equipment. Mention must be made under this chapter of unexploded ordnance which will constitute a danger for years to come.

- Remains of war equipment: High-grade steel can be recuperated from wreckage left along the roads, in the middle of villages, or in river beds, particularly in Panjshir and Bamiyan. Any projects geared towards the recuperation of this "raw material" will be very useful.

4.5 Future UN operations

Again, reference should be made to the Preface and emphasis placed on the fact that Afghanistan is a very special country which has never gone through a highly sophisticated external assistance process, and which will therefore react with particular sensitivity to the massive arrival of foreign aid. Thus, the future UN operational organization should give due consideration to the specificity of Afghan society.

In order to contribute to this effort, the members of the mission wish to make some suggestions which are a result of their reflection following this most unusual joint UN mission:

- Objectives: They should be the same as those of the local population, and should be fixed according to the priorities established by them;

- Means: They should be those required by the local population in order to attain the objective set as autonomously as possible. The UN should avoid any sophisticated and unknown technology, even if its "experts" believe that it would be a major improvement. The immediate overall goal is to rebuild a country, not to change its standard of living and traditions;

- Methods: Afghans, from the highly responsible officials to the very modest individuals, know perfectly well what they want. They should therefore be considered as full <u>partners</u> from the planning stage onwards, and not only as simple "recipients" or "beneficiaries"... When required, UN specialists' expertise should be devoted mainly to assessment and training activities.

Operational modalities:

<u>Assessment</u>: There should be an individual in-depth assessment of every need before launching any assistance programme. An easygoing approach which permitted the implementation of assistance projects on the sole basis of non-verified requests or of a simple suggestion either from the agencies' Headquarters or from the Afghans themselves would lead to a complete loss of credibility and respect which would hamper any further efforts. Reliable "monitoring" would then be impossible.

<u>Implementation</u>: Projects should be implemented by Afghan bodies or NGOs which have been fully approved by the Afghan authorities concerned (generally on the basis of the effectiveness of their achievements). However, there will be a long trial period which will require far more direct UN involvement than usual. A long training process for the implementing partners should also be envisaged.

Monitoring: Until both the Afghans and the UN agencies fully understand each other, this is going to be a difficult task. Frequent or permanent UN presence will be required. Donors should be aware of this, and should participate in the adaptation process.

Evaluation: Similarly, this is not going to be an easy task. It should therefore be undertaken regularly so that assistance programmes can be revised as often as possible until they are sufficiently in line with the objectives and specific "modus operandi" required by this very special country.

Annex I


ITINERARY - SCHEDULE

A. Travel information

No.	Stops	Province	Date
1	Diwana-Baba	Nuristan	7.10.1988
2	Kafir-Kohtal	Nuristan	8.10.1988
3	Forest of Magnaul	Badakhshan	9.10.1988
4	Robat	Badakhshan	10.10.1988
5	Skazer	Badakhshan	11-12.10.1988
6	Wishti	Badakhshan	13.10.1988
7	Sokhteq	Takhar	14.10.1988
8	Piu (Memon-Khara)	Takhar	15.10.1988
9	Warsaj	Takhar	16.10.1988
10	Mektab (near Farkhar)	Takhar	17-19 & 22-23.10.1988
11	Kesham/Jari-sabah	Badakhshan	20-21.10.1988
12	Taresht	Takhar	24.10.1988
13	Fehring	Baghlan	25.10.1988
14	Khost-e-Doabi	Baghlan	26.10.1988
15	Keluk	Baghlan	27.10.1988
16	Khawak	Kapisa	28.10. & 2.11.1988
17	Dasht-e-Rivat	Kapisa	29.11.1988
18	Barrak	Kapisa	30.10.-1.11.1988
19	Lahkbarj	Baghlan	3.11.1988
20	Nawbahar	Baghlan	4-5.11.1988
21	Qarargah 1 (Hezb-e-Islami)	Baghlan	6.11.1988
22	Qarargah 2 (Lakhawb)	Baghlan	7.11.1988
23	Dasht-e-Kelagai	Baghlan	8.11.1988
24	Kayan	Baghlan	9-11.11.1988
25	Doab-e-Mekhzarin	Bamiyan	12.11.1988
26	Shashpul	Bamiyan	13-14.11.1988
27	Tchai-Khana (near Chelam-joi)	Maidan/Wardak	15.11.1988
28	Jeghatu	Maidan/Wardak	16-19.11.1988

B. Passes.

Reference	Name	Location	Altitude (estimated) feet	Altitude (estimated) metres
a	Diwana-Baba	Pak/Afg border	14500	4350
b	Kafir-Kohtal	Nuristan/Badakhshan	17800	5350
c	Kohtal-e-Wishti	Badakhshan/Takhar	15500	4650
d	Kohtal-e-Taresht	Takhar/Baghlan	11000	3300
e	Kohtal-e-Darwasa	Baghlan/Kapisa	14000	4200
f	Kohtal-e-Khawak	Kapisa/Baghlan	13500	4050
g	Kohtal-e-Lakhawb	Baghlan	8500	2250
h	Kohtal-e-Hajigak	Bamiyan	11000	3300


AFGHANISTAN
Fahrbare Verkehrswege
(Stand 1975)

Annex II

ECONOMIC CENTRES AND SERVICES

The Salam 3 mission systematically avoided the great urban centres. However, by observing the local bazaars mentioned below, the team was able to form an impression of the exchange of goods and services:

Warsaj (Takhar Province): This town has always been fairly active from an economic standpoint, even during the war. The main reasons for this seem to be:

- The distances which separate it from the strategic communication routes;

- The relative protection provided by its geographical position and topographical surroundings;

- Its accessibility by motor vehicle (only from the north);

- Its strategic position with regard to communication routes connecting it with the other provinces by the means of transport available during war time (donkeys, horses....) as follows:

Skazer (South Badakhshan) by the Piu Pass
Anjuman (South Badakhshan) by the Wishti Pass
Paryan (Panjshir-Kapisa) by the Zard Pass
Fehring (South-East Baghlan)by the Taresht Pass
Teshkan (Central Badakhshan)

- The fact that many displaced persons, essentially from Panjshir, have sought refuge in the surrounding mountains.

The bazaar is fairly well supplied, but it lacks subsidiary services apart from the religious schools (madressa) for children. This centre could be used as a secondary storage/distribution centre. Its economic importance would be enhanced if the road construction projects submitted by the Shura-e-Nazar were actually carried out.

Farkhar (Takhar Province): This little town only fairly recently passed into the complete control of the armed opposition. It has been well supplied all along by the Kabul Government, and its change of status does not seem to have been accompanied by any significant economic change. Activity seemed normal in the bazaar, but no subsidiary services had been organized (health, education, mechanical workshops). Its relative proximity to the Shura-e-Nazar headquarters gives it a certain amount of importance, but owing to tensions between several groups of the Hezb-e-Islami (G. Hekmatyar) and the Jamiat, access to Taloqan, the provincial capital, is hazardous.

Keshem (Badakhshan Province). The mission's visit came shortly after the armed opposition had taken control of the town. There was very little commercial activity, but a large part of the town had been deserted by its inhabitants because of the fighting. Here also, there was a certain amount of tension between the Jamiat, predominant in the region, and a small Hezb-e-Islami group posted on a hill overlooking the town. However, at the time of the mission's visit, the area was calm. Apart from a few schools, the only operational service available was a mechanical workshop.

Khost (Baghlan Province). The chief interest of this town is its geographical position. It is not a major commercial centre, but its proximity to the administrative centre of Khelab (Shura-e-Nazar) gives it a certain amount of importance. From Khost, it is possible to reach Narin (Baghlan), Andarab (Baghlan) and Panjshir (Kapissa) via the Darwasa pass. Because it benefits from relatively good natural protection, it has become an accommodation centre for displaced persons from Panjshir.

Khenj (Panjshir, Kapisa Province). The vitality of the bazaar, entirely rebuilt, is quite remarkable. The case is a somewhat special one, however, since this town is the geographical centre of the precious stones trade (emeralds). In this respect, it has taken over from the town which held the role before the war, Dasht-e-Rivat.
The mission's impression was that this apparent economic well-being might be artificial, given the poor quality of the stones -- extracted without precaution, using explosives -- coupled with their exorbitant price. Private companies had apparently already offered their services in helping to improve extraction techniques, but on condition that they would have a monopoly on the trade of crystals thus extracted.

Bazarak (Panjshir, Kapisa Province). This town, entirely destroyed, has always been an economic focal point of the middle Panjshir valley. The bazaar has been revived among the ruins and the population is working actively at its reconstruction, though less progress has been made than in Khenj. The numerous vehicles arriving from Kabul bear witness to a considerable influx of displaced persons returning to Panjshir. A mechanical workshop has temporarily been set up on the site where the "model high school" planned by the Panjshir Reconstruction Committee team is supposed to be built.

Rokha (Panjshir, Kapisa Province). This administrative centre has also been thoroughly destroyed. It is in Rokha that the main unit of the regional hospital has been set up, in administrative buildings abandoned by the Government in May 1988. The medical unit for "contagious diseases" is located somewhat below Rokha, not far from Anawa, the only town which has been spared by the war.

<u>Deh-Sallah</u> (Andarab, Baghlan Province). This town has always been an important economic centre in the region, even if the administrative centre (Ala Kadari) was located in Banu, about twelve kilometres below Deh-Sallah. Its geographical location has made Deh-Sallah a focal point for the populations of the upper valley, of the Khost valley and of the Narin region. The bazaar is well supplied, but with the exception of the madresa, no services are currently available.

<u>Kayan</u> (Western part of Baghlan Province). This small capital of the Ismaelian community of the Doshi region has always been active and well organized. It has a fairly well-equipped mechanical workshop, a hospital which is remarkably constructed but largely under-equipped -- despite the presence of two doctors of which one is a lady -- recent rug-making workshops, well organized high-capacity cereal storage facilities, a school and, to the slight bewilderment of the observers, a chair production unit. A small administrative complex is in the process of being constructed along with a new mosque. There are no visible signs of direct damage attributable to the war.

<u>Doab-Mekhzarin</u> (Bamiyan Province). Located on the secondary road connecting Kabul to the north of the country, this village has always been a fairly important transit point. Even though it has suffered considerably from the war, the bazaar does generate genuine economic activity. Many private transporters are from the region, and there is a fleet of about 80 trucks serving the route between Shashpul (Bamiyan) and Barfak (Baghlan).

To the east of the village is the important but completely abandoned Eshpushta coal mine whose infrastructures are severely damaged. The populations help themselves, at their own risk, from the shafts which are still accessible. According to the information obtained, accidents are frequent (floods, gas...).

<u>Shashpul</u> (Bamiyan Province). Since the beginning of the war, this village has acquired a new kind of importance unrelated to tourism. Formerly a transit point on the route to Bamiyan and its Buddahs (the Hajigak track, the Ghorband-Shibar road, the Doshi-Doab road) and a tourist centre owing to the old Shar-e-Zohaq Citadel, it has become a strategic communications centre on the route to northern Afghanistan (both the north-east and the north-west). Its proximity to the administrative centre of Bamiyan, which was controlled by the Kabul Government until September 1988, has not prevented it from developing economically, despite the departure of the small Ismaelian community which had lived near Shashpul and sought refuge partly

in the Irak valley and partly in Kabul. Alongside military activities, a small and well organized group led by Engineer Hashemi has launched a number of small-scale projects and, over the past few months, has organized services for the population, for example:

- A hospital located at the foot of the Shar-e-Zohaq Citadel which is now in the process of being enlarged. This hospital, which employs two Afghan doctors of which one is a lady, is equipped with a small-scale laboratory, a small X-ray machine, an extremely rudimentary surgical theatre, and a dispensary which suffers from chronic shortages. It also has a section for women which is in the process of being extended. Consultations are also provided twice a week at a Bamiyan dispensary set up in the small former government hospital which had been heavily damaged and is unable to function owing to lack of personnel, equipment or means.

- A hotel with a hammam built at the exit of the town on the road to Doab-e-Mekhzarin. The level of hygiene is higher than in the "Chai-Khanas" visited.

- A fairly well equipped mechanical workshop with remarkable technicians.

- A tiny shoe repair and manufacturing workshop coupled with a small-scale clothing factory (thus far limited to internal production for the group).

- A studio for the development of black-and-white film.

- Several workshops for the recuperation and manufacture of war equipment, one of which specializes in the study of mines and explosives. This particular field is interesting, since the group has developed genuine skills with respect to de-mining and de-activation of unexploded devices.

- An experimental agricultural center aimed *inter alia* at promoting new technologies for farmers (tractors, threshers...)

And finally, this group regularly reforests the poplar plantations which would not otherwise be cared for, and in 1987 it began to restore the track from Shashpul to Kalu, which is now fit for motor vehicles. The quality of the restoration work leaves something to be desired, but the only means available were explosives and manual labour.

Bamiyan (capital of Bamiyan Province): The administrative centre and the military bases located on the plateau have been completely destroyed, and being mined, the zone is dangerous. The bazaar located in the valley functions well, even if the degree of destruction is close to 40%. Economic activity is of course practically nonexistent in comparison with its pre-war level (cf. Tourism). According to the information obtained, however, it has been on the increase since the departure of the government administration and troops. The airstrip located on the plateau has emerged from the fighting undamaged. The Shashpul-Bamiyan region is interesting both from the point of view of its geographical location and of its plurality: several ethnic and religious groups and various parties live side by side, apparently in reasonable harmony. There is no doubt that if this region were made more accessible, it should become an important focal point for assistance efforts towards the reconstruction of the central and northern parts of the country.

Jeghatu (Wardak Province): The local authorities in this region, and in particular their chief, Qazi Amin Wardak, began long ago to organize services for the populations:

- A hospital, operating with external assistance and foreign doctors (French), offers the best services in the region. It is decently equipped and has two surgical theatres, an X-ray machine and a laboratory;

- An educational system which is currently being revised because, we were told, the populations have become more demanding with regard to to the quality of the teachers and the programmes;

- The rudiments of a veterinary service which has just launched an interesting poultry production programme;

- An experimental agricultural centre aimed at:

  - manufacturing prototypes of agricultural devices (new types of swing-ploughs);

  - testing appropriate technologies (mini-tractors, reapers, thrashers, seeders...);

  - diagnosing the real deficiencies in land management and finding solutions;

  - and generally promoting new methods without provoking an abrupt break with the traditional ones.

- A cereal bank aimed at covering deficits in local production;

- The encouragement of projects aimed at land reclamation and the restoration of private agricultural or village infrastructure, as well as the cleaning or restoration of irrigation canals through a subsidized credit system;

- Vaccination campaigns in the villages of the plateau;

- Repair workshops exist, but the mission was not able to visit them.

This is an interesting example of a region where the administration is close to the populations, but practically all of the initiatives are to a large extent dependant on external assistance.

ANNEX III

COMMODITY PRICE COMPARISONS

Actual Prices in Afghani are given for October/November 1988
(where available, percentage changes are referenced to the same time 1987)

Commodity	Shazer	%	Wischti	%	Norslam	%	Khost	%	Desala	%	Gulbahar*	%	Nayan	%	Shashpul	%	Teghatu	%	Approximate inflation rate (based on table
Wheat/kg.	143	+33	57		41	+93	43	-25	37	+53	49		37	±0	39	23	43	+32	
Wheat flour/kg.			79								53		+23						
Barley	114									29	+43						29		
Rice/kg	214		171		100	+56	114	+ 33	71	+25	146	+ 46	107	+ 25	107	+ 36	92	+ 44	
Potatoes/kg	-										43				20	+ 75	25	+ 56	
Maize/kg	-				21	+275	43	10	26	+29			22	- 33					
Veg. oil/kg + 32	428				457	+190	317	+ 100	267	+90	500	+ 108		286	+ 33	264	+ 137	224	
Edible fat/kg	1,429		571		643	+296													
Beef/kg	-													429	+ 329	357	+ 25		
Mutton/kg	-										450						571	+ 61	
Tea/kg	800						800	+14	600	+114	640	+88	650	+8	928	+63	700	+ 12	
Sugar/kg	229		214				120	+50	100	±0	100	±0	100	+ 25	100	+ 75	150	+ 75	
Heroine	185		240				112	+50	30	±0	40	±10	36	±0			75	+7	
Wood Beam	1,200						600		700	+40	2,000		1,500	+650	700	+600	1,500	+30	
Average % change per location						+172		+32	+44		+44				+167			+37	+84%
(of food basket only)						+172		+29	+51		+53		+10		+105			+42	+66%

*Prices in the Panjshire are slightly higher due to an added transport component.

Annex IV

POTENTIAL COUNTERPARTS INSIDE AFGHANISTAN FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

1. The Reconstruction Committee of the Central Zone

Under the general responsibility of the Shura-e-Nazar, a Reconstruction Committee for the Central Zone was established in September 1988. Its headquarters is in Barrak, in the Panjshir valley north of Bazarak, and its Director is Mr. Kamal-Uddin.

In accordance with the geographical organization of the Shura, this Reconstruction Committee is responsible for the Central Zone which includes the Panjshir valley, the provinces of Parwan and Kapisa as well as the North of Kabul province. However, in its present form, the Committee's work is entirely concentrated on the reconstruction of the Panjshir itself. The responsibilities of the Committee include the following sectors: agriculture, return of displaced persons, the reconstruction of public buildings, and support services for the rehabilitation of private buildings.

The organization is as follows: a director and five specific sections (Reconstruction, Agriculture, Refugees, Finance and Administration).

At present the Committee has a staff of about 30 which includes eight engineers, one architect, one administrator, two finance accountants, two refugee officers and a number of support staff.

As most activities are currently directed towards the reconstruction of public infrastructure, the construction section employs most of the staff (all eight engineers, the architect and most of the support staff). Although the importance of the agricultural section was recognized, no staff had yet been employed. However, plans have been made for next year. The monthly staffing cost of the Committee was quoted at approximately Afs. 300,000; programme support cost was quoted at Afs. 600,000.

The Refugee section employs two officers and works through voluntary village representatives. Currently, their main task consists in updating detailed statistics regarding the return to Panjshir of internally displaced persons.

At the disposal of the Committee are office buildings, one jeep, five trucks, a generator, drawing materials and some basic hand tools.

The following construction work had already started at the time of the mission:

(a) Two bridges at Safid-Cleher and Shabar.

(b) A dispensary clinic at Changram (10 beds) and at Safid-Cheher (6 beds).

(c) Improvement of the road between Paimazar and Dasht-e-Rivat and its extension towards the Anjuman pass.

(d) Production of cement plates to bridge channels.

The list of planned projects presented to the mission is extensive, and includes the further reconstruction of bridges, improvements to water channels, the construction of two high schools and a hospital, as well as a major mosque. Lack of funds is delaying the implementation of these projects. For the time being, funding of the Committee is very much dependent on NGO contributions.

2. The Mustazaffin group

The Mustazaffin group is headed by Eng. Hashemi in Shashpul (near Bamiyan) and includes four engineers, two medical doctors, three agronomists and six mechanics. It has remained outside of the political spectrum while providing technical support to the population and to other Mujahedin groups. Its current programmes include: the construction of a 10-bed rural hospital, staffed by two doctors and three trained dispensers and financially supported by an NGO; de-mining activities, applying the group's knowledge of mines by providing technical assistance to other groups; a mechanical workshop to repair trucks and other vehicles; a shoe and dress-making workshop catering for local needs; an agricultural extension programme (initiated this year) aimed at revitalizing dryland agriculture in areas that have been abandoned following bombardments and frequent burning of harvests; the production of agricultural tools; and road construction activities between Shashpul and the Hajigak pass.

3. Development programmes in the Wardak region

In Wardak a number of development and rehabilitation efforts are being undertaken. Some of the approaches are innovative and might be of interest in designing future projects. It is worth noting that all of these projects are being carried out without creating a large administrative infrastructure. In fact, all development efforts are planned and implemented by only one Afghan engineer and six local assistants. Wardak is the only region visited by the mission where foreign NGO staff is working.

The existing rehabilitation/development activities include: hospital support, a livestock improvement project, a cereal bank, an appropriate agricultural technology project, waterworks construction, and an education support programme.

The hospital in Wardak was established in 1984 by a French NGO and has become the medical centre for a region extending beyond Wardak. The hospital buildings had been destroyed three times by bombardment and, because of this danger, no permanent buildings have yet been constructed. The hospital has 16 beds, surgical theatre, X-ray and laboratory facilities. Four French doctors (including one lady) work at the hospital along with trained Afghan dispensers.

All medical care is provided free of charge, and operational and support costs are financed by the NGO. Food costs for staff and patients are borne by the local community.

The livestock project is financed and managed by a specialized NGO and employs one French veterinarian and two trained Afghan assistants. The project has two components: first, to establish a basic veterinary service and second, to introduce small, privately-operated chicken hatcheries. Veterinary service also includes a vaccination programme and parasite treatment. The programmes are well accepted by the local population, and the introduction of small fees for services rendered is under consideration.

A model chicken hatchery is under construction, using local materials as well as local stock of chicken. In this context, a credit system is under consideration. If successful, the project will be of interest for other regions.

The cereal bank project was started in 1986 in response to cereal deficits observed at the village level. It is supported by NGO financial contributions. A system has been developed whereby the participating villages are classified into three categories according to need. An annual allocation of wheat is calculated on the basis of factors such as production yields, the number of needy families and available resources.

From stocks purchased elsewhere (mainly Pakistan), the allocated quantities are released to the village representatives under long-term credit agreements (six months to one year). Credits are reimbursed in the spring to replenish the subsidized revolving fund. While the repayment rate was unsatisfactory during the first year of performance, a 90% reimbursement rate was reached in 1987. Under this project, 850 MT of cereals were distributed during 1987; double this quantity is scheduled for distribution during 1988.

Appropriate agricultural technology development

Over three years, systematic efforts have been undertaken to purchase, test and adapt agricultural tools and machinery with a view to increasing agricultural efficiency. From ploughshare modifications and improved hand tools for land preparation, crop cultivation and harvesting, to small tractors and threshing machines, all acquired equipment is tested on an experimental scale and in a controlled environment. To the extent to which they prove beneficial and efficient, these tools are made available to the farming population. The scheme was conceived as a long-term project, and is just entering its promotion and extension stage. Financial limitations have brought about a slower implementation rate than originally anticipated.

The waterworks construction programme is based on food and financial subsidies which are made available to rural communities seeking to build or repair their water channels and supply lines. Village communities decide on their priorities, and are entirely responsible for the execution of construction works. A cash subsidy of some 20% is paid once the work has been accomplished.

Under the primary education programme, five schools of up to six classes for boys have been established in the area. Staffed by one Mullah, three teachers and one supervisor, the schools serve between 50 and 200 pupils per unit. All costs are paid by an NGO.

Annex V

Projects and activities envisaged by the mission

All projects and activities mentioned below are to be considered within the framework of the UN Co-ordinator's mandate. Agencies mentioned under each category of project are those which, according to the mission members, are most likely to be responsible for the conceptualisation and implementation of the relevant assistance programmes.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the following are ideas on possible projects, and not the projects themselves, which will have to be worked out by the agencies concerned. In addition, there are concrete proposals for specific activities to be undertaken as soon as possible. Projects and activities can be presented as follows:

1. Short-term projects for implementation (as of Spring 1989)

These urgent projects should be implemented as soon as possible. They will also serve to test the existing absorption/implementation capacity, and should reveal some of the difficulties which may affect international efforts towards the rehabilitation/reconstruction of the country.

1.1. Provision of food and seeds (mainly wheat grain and fertilizers) - (urea and diammonium-phosphate). In the light of the anticipated food shortage following the 1988 wheat harvest coupled with the possible return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the provision of food and seed (wheat) should be treated with equal importance.
(UN agencies: WFP, FAO and UNHCR)

1.2. Procurement and positioning of square wooden beams suitable for roof construction (5 to 6 metres long, 10x15 cm and 15x15 cm - 30 units per family).

Considering the importance of these beams and the difficulties which the UN may encounter in procuring them in sufficiently large numbers, it is essential to start as soon as possible. UNILOG should have a major role to play.
(UN agencies: WFP, UNHCR and UNDP)

1.3. Positioning of food and seeds (mainly cereals) and non-food items (hand tools, wooden beams, fertilizers, quilts, medical supplies, tents, tarpaulins etc.)

This should take place in areas (operational bases) still to be identified which will permit a reliable supply system to the beneficiaries, particularly when the time comes for returnees to return home.
(UN agencies: WFP, FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO)

1.4. Provision of hospital equipment and medical supplies

Surgical theatres (hospitals of Panjshir and Shashpul), dentistry equipment (Panjshir) and basic medicines and equipment (Panjshir, Kayan, Shashpul and Jeghatu) can be provided any time. However, the mission considers that specific recommendations need to be made by a relevant technical mission (see 3.4).
(UN agencies: WHO, UNICEF and UNDP)

2. Medium-term projects (Spring-Winter 1989)

Short-term activities ought to be pursued and/or strengthened and adapted as a means of contributing to the transition from the rehabilitation/reconstruction phase to the development phase. This implies:

2.1. Procurement and pre-positioning of food and non-food items through food-for-work schemes geared to the improvement of the public infrastructure.
(UN agencies: WFP, FAO, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO and UNESCO)

2.2. Procurement of wooden beams through food-for-work programmes which may include, in addition to the reconstruction of private dwellings, the setting up of relevant workshops (e.g. carpentries, hand tool production etc).
(UN agencies: WFP, ILO, UNHCR and UNDP)

2.3. Procurement of hand tools and mechanical appliances through the implementation of reconstruction-/development-oriented projects in most economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, light industry, mechanical workshops etc.).
(UN agencies: WFP, ILO, FAO, UNDP and UNHCR)

3. Activities

Joint UN technical missions should visit the areas mentioned in this report. They should concentrate on the identification of measures which might improve the existing capacity (training, equipment etc.) avoiding as much as possible the importation of foreign expert teams. They might have to stay for a longer period than Salam 3 in order to carry out in-depth assessments in their field of expertise and to come up with proposals for specific projects.

The sectors concerned might be the following:

3.1. Basic infrastructure

At this stage, priority should be given to an urgent assessment of the road network and the existing storage capacity.
(UN agencies: WFP and UNDP)

3.2. Agricultural activities

The primary objectives of UN missions should be linked with the existing food shortage. Small projects proposed by Salam 3 (basically food and seed procurement) should be completed with more far-reaching ones. While keeping long-term objectives in view, it is also necessary to assess the production capacity of the most fertile valleys with a view to the implementation of development projects which would contribute to an increase in average food production in areas such as the northern Badakhshan valleys (e.g. Keshem) and the valleys of Andarab, Khost-Fereng etc.

The creation and implantation of tree nurseries as well as the identification of crop pest and disease control projects are among the issues to be addressed by these missions.
(UN agencies: FAO, WFP and UNDP)

3.3. Livestock requirements

Veterinary and zootechnical expertise is urgently required in order to tackle the main diseases and herd-related problems affecting livestock in all regions visited. Since a number of areas show is no trace of any former veterinary service, recommendations should be made with regard to the introduction of the most urgently needed measures.
(UN agencies: FAO and UNDP)

3.4. Public health.

Sanitation and hygiene are almost unknown. Immunization campaigns have been implemented in a few places only. Public health services are far below minimum requirements. Hospitals and health centres need to be adequately equipped to cater for basic needs, particularly as these are increasing with the return of displaced persons and refugees. Specific requirements must be identified and concrete projects proposed by specialized UN personnel.
(UN agencies: WHO, UNICEF and UNDP)

3.5. Education

Nowhere is there a concrete and realistic education programme. Motivation among the rural population is low, and the relevant administration is weak. In some areas there seems to be a large number of teachers available, in others almost none. How to identify priorities and available resources, how to find ways to set up an education programme which fits the requirements and can be financed, on a long-term basis, by Afghans themselves -- these are some of the main issues that should be addressed as soon as possible by the relevant UN technical missions.
(UN agencies: UNESCO, UNICEF and UNDP)

Annex VI

FOOD NEEDS ASSESSMENT & ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

Even once the various Salam missions have highlighted general trends and production patterns, assessments of overall or regional food needs will remain guesswork, aimed at overcoming the absence of reliable production data and incorporating highly differentiated agricultural patterns which vary from valley to valley and region to region. It will also have to be borne in mind that the Afghans are innovative people who will employ market mechanisms to their best advantage, thus reaching far beyond their national, not to mention their traditional, boundaries. Moreover, they are hardened people who have lived through periodic food shortages which have further aggravated their lot.

The most critical period for a large part of the population of the north-eastern and east-central provinces is the period from December through April, when winter conditions impede their movement and food stocks diminish before the subsequent harvest. As a self-help measure, some local authorities have attempted to tackle the expected food shortage by identifying their economically most disadvantaged families and permitting them to benefit from any assistance which may become available. However, this measure does not, in itself, quantify or resolve the overall shortfall in agricultural production which will have to be met through international assistance.

The mission has therefore attempted to develop an approximate regional cereal needs assessment, by extrapolating population figures of 1979 and applying adjusted provincial cereal self-sufficiency levels from the prewar period. By relating these to the importance of rain-fed vs. irrigated agriculture per province and to a probable failure rate of rain-fed crops (which itself is related to reduced seed germination rates and sub-optimal nitrogen/phosphate application as elaborated elsewhere), provincial cereal production deficits can be classified in two categories: a structural food deficit and an irregular production shortfall due to seasonal variations.

CEREAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT FOR NORTH-EASTERN & EAST-CENTRAL AFGHANISTAN

PROVINCES	POP CNS 79 ('000)	EST.POP 89 ('000)	EST.CRL. SELFSUFF (in %)	RAINFED PRDCTN. (in %)	STRUCTURAL DEFICIT (MT)	RAINFED PRD.DEF. 88 (MT)	TTL.CRL. DEFICIT 88/89 (MT)
BADAKSHAN	698	395	80	70	17,400	34,100	51,500
TAKHAR	520	622	90	50	9,100	28,600	37,700
BAGHLAN	494	590	110	40	-8,600	76,600	18,000
KUNDUZ	555	663	120	40	-19,400	32,500	13,100
SAMANGAN	273	326	100	50		16,700	16,700
PARWAN	410	490	90	60	7,200	18,000	25,200
BAMIYAN	269	322	90	50	4,700	14,800	19,500
KAPISA	346	414	90	40	6,000	15,200	21,200
WARDAK	288	344	100	30		10,600	10,600
GHAZNI	647	773	100	30		23,700	23,700
LAGHMAN	311	372	100	30		11,400	11,400
KABUL	1,319	1,577	70	30	69,100	33,800	102,900
TOTALS	5,930	7,088			85,500	266,000	351,500

PARAMETERS AND ASSUMPTIONS:

Pop. growth p. a. :	1.8 %	estimated
Constant over :	10 years	failure rate of rainfed crops: 70 %
Minimum daily cereal consumption :	400 g	
Calculation based on :	365 days	

As the table suggests, structural food deficits in the north-eastern provinces of Badakhshan and Takhar are compensated by food surpluses in the neighbouring provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz, where irrigated agriculture is predominant. A lively trade within the region has certainly prevailed and seems not to have been affected by the resistance war. Food crop surpluses in Baghlan may actually be somewhat larger, since a significant portion of the local population has sought refuge in Pakistan.

The structural food deficit in the central-eastern provinces is minimal, and may have been further reduced by some population outflow into refugee camps in Pakistan, particularly from Parwan province. The remaining structural deficit has, in the past, almost certainly been met by regional trade, originating in provincial capitals which were supplied through government channels.

Following this reasoning, and assuming a continuation of USSR cereal imports and trading patterns at hitherto stated levels, the annual structural food deficit in the referenced provinces will be adequately met. The problems related to the unusual -- though periodically observed -- fall in the yield of rainfed crops in 1988 due to unfavourable weather patterns needs, however, to be urgently addressed as the affected population enters the most critical period of late winter to early summer, i.e., before the first spring crops can be reaped.

The population is no doubt well aware of the impending food shortage and will make all possible preparations in order to mitigate its impact. One of these measures will be the reduction of daily consumption, as has been done before during similar periods (the most recent having been in 1983). Some family assets will be sold in order to generate cash for additional market purchases, and loans will be taken out within the community. Animal stocks will be decimated or sold off to compensate for the lack of cereals. Traditional and well-established trading mechanisms will be reinforced to meet the increased demand from cereal stocks anywhere within reach.

There is no doubt, however, that substantial residual cereal deficits will remain, and the international community will be called upon to help in compensating them. Any intervention will face logistic constraints which may only be aggravated by their political context (cf. sections 3.3 and 3.4). Even though the mission sincerely hopes that such constraints can be duly resolved in the interest of the Afghan people. It would not be appropriate to recommend a realistic course of action based on such an assumption.

To provide a rough indication of commodity volumes that can probably be absorbed and used <u>during the next six to nine months</u> in a number of provinces in Afghanistan, the mission would like to suggest the following orientative quantity indicators. They attempt to incorporate observations with respect to market activities in provincial trading centres, the administrative capacity of local authorities and their expressed readiness and willingness to undertake food-for-work activities, without losing touch with logistical realities.

In Badakhshan province, food-for-work activities could absorb some 4,000 metric tons of wheat and 350 metric tons of oil. Market sales, provided they can be properly organized within a reasonable period of time, and assuming provincial capitals are accessible and no security interruptions occur, may reach some 20,000 tons.

In the Panjshir valley, food-for-work activities/relief operations could absorb some 3,000 tons of wheat and 250 tons of edible fats, again with the proviso that security considerations do not constitute an important handicap.

Around the trading centres of Bamiyan city, Shashpul and Doab Mehzarin in Bamiyan province, food-for-work activities should be able to absorb some 1,000 tons of wheat and 100 tons of edible fats/oils, while market sales may reach 7,000 tons of wheat.

In the provinces of Takhar, Kunduz, Samangan and Balkh, food assistance needs have not been assessed by the mission, but are judged to be nil or minimal.

On the other hand, food assistance is likely to be needed in Parwan, Kapisa and Wardak, but with the exception of Wardak (some 4,000 tons of cereals), the mission has not yet been able to carry out an assessment. As a rough guess, some 10,000 tons of wheat and some 800 tons of oil/edible fat could probably be absorbed through sales and NGO-supported food-for-work activities.

Annex VII

FOOD-FOR-WORK NORMS

Individual UN and private voluntary organizations have been tempted to classify possible target groups for the assistance programmes. The mission would like to remark that a division of beneficiaries by category (returnees, internally displaced, food-for-work, vulnerable groups and hospital patients, orphans, school children, etc.) implies structures and personnel to facilitate and control the distribution of assistance packages.

The realities observed are in fact different, and social structures and customs do not readily support such divisions. Administrative entities are new and still in the process of formation. Their absorptive capacity for traditional assistance will be further limited by inexperience, lack of financial resources and personnel, and often by the novelty of the concepts involved in the execution of any structured assistance.

The mission generally observed a great interest for the "help-for-work" concept and a clear consensus among village administrators and elders that free assistance to large sections of the population must be avoided where possible, and should only be considered for a limited period of time in exceptional circumstances. It is doubtful, however, that assistance on the scale required can actually be absorbed in such a manner. Varied and improving administrative capacities notwithstanding, the mission is convinced that structured rehabilitation and reconstruction activities will start slowly, with a lot of setbacks and disappointments on both sides. This is normal, and should not reflect negatively on the goodwill and determination of the Afghan population.

The mission therefore proposes that organizations should initially concentrate on developing delivery channels and agree upon distribution preferences with recipient administrations (i.e. food-for-work projects, family support and general relief operations as conditions may warrant, institutional support to hospitals and schools where they exist), bearing in mind that differential rations and beneficiary selection will complicate accountability and burden administrative services.

Where varying necessities and conditions in individual valleys and regions so suggest and the local population so wishes, the mission encourages technically experienced and action-oriented NGOs to consider installing themselves with a view to strengthening and supporting local administrative and technical services.

For planning purposes, average work norms are proposed on the basis of consultations with local engineers and village representatives. These norms may need to be revised once respective experience has been gained on all sides. The list is

not exhaustive and the absence of activities should not imply that the mission does not recommend them for implementation. It should be noted that two meals per day are already an integral component of labour contracts. Their respective value is not, however, included in the wage component. If labour costs are partially compensated by food rations, appropriate adjustments should be made on the basis of their local value.

Activity	Man-days (number)	Cost of* wages* (skilled & unskilled)	Cost of materials & tools
		(in local currency) **	
Road construction (per km.)			
Easy/flat terrain	700	300,000	400,000
Mountainous	1,200	500,000	700,000
Road repairs (per km.)			
Easy/flat terrain	150	65,000	80,000
Mountainous terrain	250	100,000	130,000
Bridge construction			
Local materials	900	390,000	450,000
Reinforced/cement	900	390,000	700,000
Irrigation works (per km)			
Construction (standard)	3,500	1,500,000	200,000
Repairs & rehabilitation	1,000	420,000	150,000
Community buildings (per room, shell only)			
Hospitals, dispensaries***	120	95,000	400,000
Schools***	100	80,000	350,000
Houses (traditional)	90	40,000	100,000
Agricultural land rehabilitation (per jerib = 1/5 ha.)			
	40	15,000	20,000

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* Average daily wages indicated to the mission:
- For unskilled labor: 280 - 500 Afs
- For skilled labor: 600 - 1,200 Afs

** The official exchange rate at the time of the mission's visit was of US$ 1 = 55 Afghanis. In the money market in Pakistan, and inside Afghanistan, the rate regularly quoted was US$ 1 = 180.- Afghanis.

*** Construction of permanent, minimum maintenance structures.

Annex VIII

ORGANIGRAMME OF THE SHURA-E-NAZAR

The Shura-e-Nazar, or Supervisory Council, headed by Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, is an administrative organization which has been geographically divided into four areas:

Area one: Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz and Baghlan

Area Two: Parwan, North of Kapisa Province, Bamiyan and North of Kabul province

Area Three: Laghman, South Kapisa, Kunar and Nangahar

Area Four: Samangan, Balkh, Jowsjan, Faryab.

The mission visited regions located in the first two areas only. In each of them the administration is organized according to the following levels:

Village: Where Afghan and military structures are mixed;

Qarargah: A purely military structure, but which constitutes the main administrative unit for the implementation of major decisions (including those related to the civilian society). The Qarargah is responsible for several villages. People responsible are chosen by the Council.

Payegah: This is the most important decision-making level. The Payegah covers several Qarargahs (e.g. the Payegah of Panjshir covers 22 Qarargahs). At this level, the administration is organized as follows:

Head of the Payegah
(in charge of military areas
and civilian affairs)

Civilian Administration

Military Administration

- Council of Religious Affairs
- Popular Council
  (Grey Beards)

- Financial Committee
- Reconstruction Committee
- Political/Education Committee
- Relations Committee
- Legal Committee
- General Prosecutor
- Administration Committee
- Public Health Committee
- Transport Committee

NB: Members of Councils and Committees are chosen by the Supervisory Council.

Provinces: This level is still theoretical, since the administrative organization has not yet been worked out.

Areas: At this level, priority is given to issues related to the civilian society. The areas are organized as follows:

Head of he Area
(In charge of military and civilian affairs) --------

- Legal Committee
- General Prosecutor
- Finance Committee
- Cultural Committee
- Education Committee
- Political Committee
- Relations Committee
- Public Health Committee

(NB: At the time of the mission's visit, a decision had not been taken as to whether there should be a Reconstruction Committee at this level or not)

NB: Members are proposed by the Council and appointed by the Jamiat-e-Islami party.

The Council: The highest level, organized as follows:

Head of the Council
(Capt. Ahmad Shah Massoud) ------

- Legal Committee
- General Prosecutor
- Financial Committee
- Political Committee
- Cultural Committee
- Relations Committee
- Public Health Committee
- Administrative Council
- Reconstruction Committee
- Transport Committee
- Education Committee
- Military Committee

NB 1: The Head of the Council proposes candidates to the Jamiat-e-Islami, which then decides on the membership of the Council and the Committees.

NB 2: Areas of responsibility of the Reconstruction Committee: Refugees/returnees, agricultural affairs, economic projects and specific reconstruction activities.

Projects submitted to the mission by the Shura-e-Nazar

1. Roads to be repaved, improved or constructed

a. Toloqan/Faysabad (175 km)
b. Faysabad/Top-Khana (190 km)
c. Top-Khana/Maghlahoul/Anjuman/Paryan (130 km)
d. Piu/Khotal-e-Wishti (55 km)
e. Banghi/Andarab/Khost (150 km)
f. Eskamish/Khelab (... km)
g. Khawak/Dasht-e-Rivat (25 km)

2. Irrigation channels

a. Toloqan/Khoshakwa (70 km) - Sharahan Channel -
b. Khetayan/Tarmabai (30 km) - Gaonmoli Channel -
c. Kobcha - Daria/Pashteharchi (80 km) - Archi Desert (Kunduz)
d. Warsaj/Farkhar (... km) - Mianshar Channel -
e. Suchi/Deshtpelf (11 km) - Palfi Channel (Khon)
f. Suchi/Deshtebarak (9 km)

3. Construction of a dam at Tutak (north of Farkhar)

